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 PHE INTRODUCTION of laboratory exper-
 imentation in economics was moti-
 vated by theories of industrial organiza-
 tion and market performance. The first
 published market experiments were those
 of Edward H. Chamberlin (1948). He ex-
 plored the behavioral characteristics of
 markets he described as being "purely"
 but not "perfectly" competitive and he
 thought that the principles of monopolis-
 tic competition would be more useful than
 the textbook theory of demand and supply
 in explaining the observed behavior. Aus-
 tin C. Hoggatt (1959) and Heinz Sauer-
 mann and Reinhard Selten (1959) both fo-
 cused on markets with three competitors
 and independently provided the first ex-
 perimental evidence that the Cournot
 model might be a reasonably accurate de-
 scription of oligopolistic behavior. Oli-
 gopoly and bilateral monopoly motivated
 the classic work of Lawrence E. Fouraker
 and Sidney Siegel (1963) which intro-
 duced several of the techniques still used
 today. Vernon L. Smith's (1962) sensitivity
 to the organization of the U.S. security in-
 dustry led him to the fundamental discov-
 ery that the law of competitive demand
 and supply can be observed operating in
 an experimental environment. The field
 of experimental economics has experi-
 enced substantial evolution during the in-
 tervening twenty years. This paper is an
 attempt to provide an introduction to the
 methods and an assessment of available
 results which might now be useful to the
 students of industrial organization.
 The paper has six sections. Section I out-
 lines some of the step-by-step details of
 laboratory procedures. Sections II through
 IV summarize experimental results. In
 Section II markets with several partici-
 pants are analyzed and compared to a
 competitive model. Section III summa-
 rizes monopoly results. Section IV, which
 is the longest, deals with oligopoly. This
 organization of the material is natural
 from the point of view of traditional the-
 ory, but the organization is not necessarily
 natural from the point of view of results.
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 As will become evident from the following
 pages, market institutions have a substan-
 tial influence on performance and this in-
 fluence sometimes outweighs the impor-
 tance of market concentration and
 relative firm size. Consequently, on occa-
 sion it is easier to organize and summarize
 results according to market institutions as
 opposed to numbers, size, or other eco-
 nomic parameters.
 The fifth section addresses the obvious
 question regarding the relevance of labo-
 ratory methods. Section V outlines several
 common criticisms of experimental meth-
 ods, which define both the limitations and
 the qualifications that must accompany
 conclusions drawn from experimental evi-
 dence, and discusses them in terms of re-
 sults. The recent explosion of professional
 interest in experimental methods reflects,
 in part, a recognition that experimental
 methods provide a source of shared expe-
 rience for scholars who are developing
 and evaluating theories about compli-
 cated, naturally occurring processes.
 While laboratory processes are simple in
 comparison to naturally occurring pro-
 cesses, they are real processes in the sense
 that real people participate for real and
 substantial profits and follow real rules in
 doing so. It is precisely because they are
 real that they are interesting. General the-
 ories must apply to special cases, so models
 believed to be applicable to complicated
 naturally occurrinig processes should cer-
 tainly be expected to help explain what
 occurs in simple, special-case laboratory
 markets. Theories which do not apply to
 the special cases are not general theories
 and thus cannot be advocated as such.
 I. Laboratory Market Details
 Real markets are easy to create. The dif-
 ficult part is creating a market that dem-
 onstrates a point which remains valid
 upon replication in other subject pools
 and by other experimenters. Because we
 now know that market behavior is sensi-
 tive to both individual preferences and
 to the details of the structure of the institu-
 tional arrangements, the experimenter
 must avoid contaminating these variables
 with poorly developed experimental pro-
 cedures. If the experimental procedures
 do not control these variables adequately,
 attempts to replicate the results may fail
 because the experimenter has unknow-
 ingly failed to conduct the same experi-
 ment. This section is a brief outline of the
 procedures, methods, and measurements.
 A. Market Creation
 The key economic variables in all mar-
 kets are the value individuals place on the
 object being transacted, and the form of
 the market organization within which
 buyers and sellers interact. Preferences
 are induced by a special application of de-
 rived demand theory called induced pref-
 erence theory (Smith, 1976b; Plott, 1979).
 The theory takes advantage of the fact
 that principles of economics apply to all
 commodities which are valued indepen-
 dently of the source of individual values
 or the ultimate use to which the commodi-
 ties are to be put. In an experimental mar-
 ket subjects normally trade a commodity
 such as a chit of paper that has no intrinsic
 or use value. The commodity is given
 value by the experimental rules governing
 its creation by sellers and redemption
 value by buyers. Buyers make money by
 buying from sellers and reselling to the
 experimenter according to a predeter-
 mined redemption value schedule. The
 difference between the purchase price
 and redemption value is profit, which is
 the buyer's to keep. Sellers make a profit
 by purchasing units from the experimen-
 ter at a predetermined cost schedule and
 selling to the buyers. The difference is a
 profit which the seller keeps. In addition
 to these profits, participants sometimes re-
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 ceive a small commission for each trade.
 The role of the commission will be ex-
 plained below.
 The idea is deceptively simple. The key
 assumptions are that an individual prefers
 more money to less, has no attitude to-
 ward the commodity or situation other
 than the advantages created by potential
 resale, and that the individual fully under-
 stands the terms of resale. If these condi-
 tions hold, the redemption and cost sched-
 ules are limit price schedules for the
 subjects. The first column of Figure 1 con-.
 tains an example of what buyers typically
 see. Row 1 shows the redemption value
 of the first unit this individual purchases
 during a period. The purchase price is en-
 tered in row 2, and the profit and profit
 plus commission are entered in rows 3 and
 4 respectively. As can be seen, these en-
 tries are made for each purchase during
 a period.
 Neglecting the commission for a mo-
 ment, the incentives of individual i can
 be represented by a total revenue func-
 tion Ri(xi) indicating the revenue gener-
 ated by a quantity of purchases xi. The
 magnitude Ri(xi) - Ri(xi - 1), the re-
 demption value for the xi th. unit can be
 seen as a limit price function. In the exam-
 ple shown in Figure 1 it is negatively
 sloped, but of course the slope as well as
 the pattern of such redemption value
 functions across agents are parameters un-
 der the control of the experimenter. Un-
 der competitive assumptions this redemp-
 tion value schedule is the individual's
 inverse demand schedule. Thus the exper-
 imenter, by varying these parameters, can
 control demand elasticity, market concen-
 tration, and other magnitudes of eco-
 nomic interest.
 Incentives of suppliers are induced in
 a similar manner. The second column in
 Figure 1 demonstrates the technique for
 a typical individual supplier. Row 2 con-
 tains the cost of the first unit sold. This
 cost is incurred at the time of the sale.
 When the sale is made, the seller enters
 the selling price in the first row and then
 calculates the profits and profit plus com-
 mission as directed by rows 3 and 4. The
 profit from other sales made during this
 period is similarly calculated. Thus, indi-
 vidual i has a cost function Ci(xi), and the
 marginal cost, Ci(xz) - Ci(xi - 1), has al-
 ready been calculated for the individual
 as shown on the forms. The shapes of the
 cost functions across sellers determine
 supply elasticity, concentration and entry,
 and are controlled by the experimenter.
 At the top of Figure 1 you will notice
 a period indicator. Experimental markets
 are usually conducted over a series of peri-
 ods or "trading days." The length of a pe-
 riod is normally from five to fifteen min-
 utes depending upon the volume of
 activity anticipated. Unless the commod-
 ity has some explicit properties of an asset
 which has a life over time (Robert For-
 sythe, Thomas R. Palfrey, and Plott, 1982),
 each period is like an independent trading
 day with demands, supplies, profit poten-
 tial, etc., independent of (but possibly
 identical with) those of previous periods.
 It is well established that trading patterns
 change as the market days are replicated.
 No good model of this dynamic exists but,
 as will be demonstrated below, the market
 equilibration process occurs with the rep-
 lication of market periods.
 Whether an individual is shown the re-
 demption value for all periods at one time
 or just for one period at a time varies ac-
 cording to the purpose of the experiment.
 In many cases the individual knows his/
 her own redemption values for all periods
 at the beginning of the experiment, but
 there are important exceptions. If individ-
 ual costs or redemption values are chang-
 ing each period, for example, these would
 be revealed one at a time just before a
 period began. In almost all experiments
 the individual knows only his/her re-
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 Redemption Values Costs
 Individual Buyer Number Individual Seller Number
 Period Period
 Unit Row Value Unit ow Value
 1 1st unit redemption value $2.00 1 selling price
 2 purchase price 2 'cost of 1st unit $ .25
 3 profit 3 profit
 4 profit + 15? commission 4 profit + 15? commission
 5 2nd unit redemption value $1.50 5 selling price
 6 purchase price 6 cost of 2nd unit $ .75
 2 2
 7 profit 7 profit
 8 profit + 15? commission 8 profit + 15? commission
 9 3rd unit redemption value $1.00 9 selling price
 10 purchase price 10 cost of 3rd unit $1.00
 3-3-
 11 profit 11 profit
 12 profit + 15? commission 12 profit + 15? commission
 13 4th unit redemption value $ .75 13 selling price
 14 purchase price 14 cost of 4th unit $1.25
 -4-
 15 profit 15 profit
 16 profit + 15? commission 16 profit + 15? commission
 17 5th unit redemption value $ .25 17 selling price
 18 purchase price 18 cost of 5th unit $1.75
 5 5-
 19 profit 19 profit
 20 profit + 15? commission 20 profit + 15? commission
 Total period earnings Total period earnings
 Figure 1. Redemption and Cost Incentive Forms
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 demption value and nothing about the re-
 demption value of others.' The proce-
 dures and instructions are designed to
 keep this type of information private.
 Commissions are not always used. It is
 known that individuals tend not to trade
 units unless there is some advantage for
 doing so. The function of the commission
 is thus to induce marginal trades by over-
 coming what seems to be a small transac-
 tions cost (Plott and Smith, 1978). Subjects
 are instructed not to trade at prices which
 are above (below) redemption values, thus
 avoiding the problem of including the
 commission as part of the limit price. More
 recent experimentation has dropped the
 use of commission and avoided the "mar-
 ginal trade" problem by adjusting the
 market parameters to allow for some gains
 from trade at the margin.
 The institutional organization of a mar-
 ket has been an important treatment vari-
 able. The mechanics of how buyers and
 sellers get together can substantially influ-
 ence market performance. That is, for the
 same underlying incentives, the market
 performance is affected by a change of
 institutions. For example, the original ex-
 periments by Chamberlin (1948) had the
 agents circulating in a room and privately
 negotiating price when a buyer or seller
 was contacted. In some of these markets
 terms of trade were publicly displayed on
 the blackboard as they were consum-
 mated, while in others they were not. This
 market behaves much differently than,
 say, an oral double auction. In an oral dou-
 ble auction all bids and offers are orally
 tendered and publicly displayed, and only
 one outstanding (the last, the best, etc.)
 bid and offer open at any time. Sellers
 (buyers) are free to accept an outstanding
 bid (offer) by a public, verbal indication.
 Thus, in the oral double auction, all bids,
 offers, and contracts are public informa-
 tion.
 Much of traditional industrial organiza-
 tion theory was developed to meet a need
 for understanding economic processes in
 which the market institutions themselves
 are endogenous. Questions regarding
 market conduct, market practices, cartel
 development and evolution are all of pri-
 mary importance, but they have not yet
 been addressed by experimentalists who,
 with very few exceptions, have tended to
 treat institutional variables as exogenous.
 Such decisions by experimentalists reflect,
 in part, a need for more theory about the
 creation and evolution of market institu-
 tions.
 Five prominent forms of market institu-
 tions have been studied in the experimen-
 tal literature: (a) auction markets, (b)
 posted-bid (offer) markets, (c) negotiated-
 price (telephone) markets, (d) markets
 with price protection and advance notice
 policies, and (e) sealed-bid (offer) markets.
 Actually, the listing of only five different
 types involves an oversimplification. Each
 of these types can be subdivided further
 into special types. Auction markets, for ex-
 ample, can be either English or Dutch ac-
 cording to whether the prices start low
 and are bid up by competition or start
 high and are reduced until some competi-
 tor accepts. English auctions can be "oral
 double" or "one-sided." Markets differ ac-
 cording to whether or not the terms of
 contracts are public and the sequence in
 which bids, offers, and terms become
 known. The possibilities are so numerous
 that it sometimes seems more appropriate
 to think in terms of a continuum rather
 than fixed classes. For example, posted-
 price auctions look very similar to "sealed-
 bid" auctions if sellers must post prices
 without the knowledge of the prices of
 other sellers and without the ability to im-
 I Only one market experiment has allowed such
 complete information and it did not converge as ex-
 pected (Smith, 1981). Bargaining experiments re-
 ported in Alvin E. Roth, Michael W. K. Malauf, and
 J. Keith Murnigham (1981) also suggest that models
 must be modified in the presence of an informational
 environment in which all monetary values are
 known by all agents.
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 mediately "adjust" prices in light of the
 competition.
 B. Laboratory Procedures
 The experimental procedures are one
 of the most important aspects of an experi-
 ment. The wording and the format of the
 instructions in most experiments have
 evolved so that very little about them is
 arbitrary or has escaped careful scrutiny.
 This extreme care is dictated by two over-
 riding concerns. First, the procedures
 must be formulated so that other research-
 ers, when following them, will be able to
 replicate reported results. The heart of
 the experimental method is replication
 and the procedures embody the opera-
 tional content of many of the parameters
 and experimental conditions which, if
 changed, may induce different results. If
 results are to replicate with different sub-
 ject pools and different experimenters,
 then the procedures must be carefully
 considered. Secondly, there is a wide-
 spread belief that experimenters will or
 can influence the behavior of subjects by
 subtle suggestion about what the experi-
 menter wants to demonstrate. Whether
 this belief is well founded is open to ques-
 tion,2 but regardless of the answer the pro-
 cedures must minimize the potential for
 such influences if the results are to be
 taken seriously by a large number of peo-
 ple.
 Each of thq procedural steps is subject
 to experimental control. Typically, sub-
 jects are recruited by announcements in
 class, bulletin boards, or newspapers.3
 Once subjects are assembled, the instruc-
 tions are read and questions answered.
 Sometimes a practice period, or period
 zero in which no money is at stake, is con-
 ducted. The technology used during the
 experiment is dictated by many consider-
 ations including availability. Many experi-
 ments simply utilize a classroom with a
 chalkboard to record trades. Faculty of-
 fices and the connecting telephone sys-
 tem, the word processing system from
 typing pools, and even special electronic
 equipment designed for the experiment
 have been used. The most fully automated
 experiments are those using an interactive
 computer system called PLATO which al-
 lows subjects to be located in different cit-
 ies (Arlington W. Williams, 1980). Because
 computerized procedures involve high
 setup costs, they are typically not used to
 explore radically new (from an experi-
 mentalist's point of view) forms of market
 institutions and organization.
 The Appendix contains sample instruc-
 tions for posted-price markets and for
 oral auctions. Notice that subjects are not
 told to maximize or to make as much
 money as possible. Furthermore, words
 like "competition," "maximizing, " "col-
 lusion," "coalition," etc., or other words
 which might suggest to the subject some
 theory or expectation on the part of the
 experimenter, have been carefully omit-
 ted. The examples used to illustrate ac-
 counting conventions and profit computa-
 tions are standard across many different
 experiments. In fact, attempts are made
 to maintain-across vastly different types
 of experiments (e.g., committees vs. mar-
 kets)-as much of the wording and exam-
 ples as possible in order to minimize the
 latitude for theories which seek to explain
 the results of a particular experimental se-
 ries in terms of the language used in the
 instructions for that series. The instruc-
 tions make clear the opportunities availa-
 ble to the subjects, but the motivation is
 supplied by the people.
 The procedures can differ according to
 the purposes of the experiment. For exam-
 2A possible example within the framework re-
 viewed in this paper is explored in Linda Cohen,
 Michael E. Levine, and Plott (1978). The case is one
 in which the subjects in a committee experiment
 evidently thought they were to provide insights for
 marketing strategies and ignored the incentive sys-
 tem in an attempt to do so.
 3 Sample announcements can be found in Eliza-
 beth Hoffman and Plott (forthcoming).
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 ple, marginal values are displayed in Fig-
 ure 1 as opposed to total values so subjects
 need not compute the former in making
 decisions. It was done for them. The indi-
 viduals take tests at the end of the instruc-
 tion period to see if they can read these
 tables as hypothesized. After each of the
 first several periods, each individual's ac-
 counting is checked to see if there is any
 misunderstanding about the reward struc-
 ture. Questions about the mechanics of
 calculating profits are welcomed and an-
 swered fully and openly. Yet, if someone
 asks, "What am I supposed to do?" the
 experimenter rereads the relevant por-
 tion of the instructions: "The experimen-
 ters do not care whether or how you par-
 ticipate so long as you stay within the
 confines of the rules." Presumably, if the
 capacity of an individual to understand
 or to recognize a reward structure was a
 variable to be studied as part of the mar-
 ket, then all of these procedures should
 possibly be changed, but for most of the
 experiments reviewed here this was not
 an objective.
 Some of the procedures are adopted to
 allow individuals as much "indepen-
 dence" from the social situation as possi-
 ble. Social security numbers and names
 (both of which are used as receipts for the
 monetary payments) are collected after
 the experiment is over. Individuals are
 paid in private so others need never know
 their earnings. When individuals are obvi-
 ously confused or are having difficulty
 with the instructions, efforts are made to
 avoid any embarrassment. Commodity
 names or references to "similar" types of
 natural situations (stock markets, automo-
 bile industry, etc.) are usually not used in
 order to avoid giving some impression
 about how individuals are expected to act.
 The level of incentives is typically some-
 what above the hourly wage for the sub-
 ject pool. For upper class undergraduate
 or graduate students the expected earn-
 ings are in the eight to ten dollars per
 hour range if the models are reasonably
 accurate. Employed adults participating
 at night or on weekends would earn more.
 Sometimes a flat payment, promised as a
 minimum in order to attract subjects, is
 paid at the beginning of the experiment
 in addition to money earned during the
 experiment.
 From a pragmatic point of view experi-
 mentalists realize that their experiments
 will be checked by other researchers.
 Such researchers may have a vested inter-
 est in having the results not replicate. This
 is especially true in fields like industrial
 organization in which the data can be-
 come part of an adversary process. An un-
 ambiguous and complete set of experi-
 mental procedures is an important source
 of protection.
 C. Performance Measures
 Price patterns, volume, distribution,
 and market efficiency are variables of ob-
 vious interest. Usually price is measured
 as the average of contract prices during
 a period but sometimes it means the last
 contract in a period. Volume and income
 distribution are easily observed.
 Efficiency as introduced by Plott and
 Smith (1978) is more subtle, but the reader
 should note that it is exactly the traditional
 consumers' plus producers' surplus notion.
 In market experiments the system attains
 an efficient (Pareto optimal) allocation if
 and only if the subjects as a group maxi-
 mize the total monetary payments from
 the experimenter. Thus, the relative effi-
 ciency of systems is determined by com-
 paring the total payment to subjects with
 the maximum possible total payment.
 In order to demonstrate how this mea-
 sure of efficiency is related to ideas of con-
 sumers' plus producers' surplus, consider
 Figure 2. Assume the economy has two
 demanders, numbered 1 and 2, and two
 suppliers, numbered 3 and 4. The de-
 manders are identical and each has the
 redemption values shown in Figure 1. The
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 Price
 1 2
 $2.00
 1.75 -
 3 4
 1 2
 1.50
 1.25
 3 4
 1 2
 1.00 34
 1 2
 .75-
 3 4
 .50-
 1 2
 .25
 3 4
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
 Units Per Period
 Figure 2. Aggregated Li1mit Values
 suppliers are also identical and each has
 the marginal cost schedule in Figure 1.
 The market demand function is obtained
 by adding the (inverted) individual limit
 price functions, and the market supply is
 obtained by adding the (inverted) individ-
 ual marginal cost functions. As can be
 seen, consumer plus producer surplus is
 maximized at six units with each buyer
 (seller) buying (selling) three (three) units.
 A quick check indicates that this allocation
 also maximizes total subject profits from
 the experiment. If, for example, another
 unit was purchased, the subjects' payment
 to the experimenter (marginal cost) would
 exceed experimenter payment to the sub-
 jects (redemption value) on this unit. Total
 profits would thus be decreased.
 A typical market inefficiency would be
 of the following sort. Individual 3 from
 Figure 2 sells four units and individual 4
 sells one. Exactly why and how this might
 occur is, of course, material for the field
 of industrial organization. From Figure 2
 one can see that individual 3's fourth unit
 should have been excluded from the mar-
 ket because its cost is greater than the
 marginal benefit. Furthermore, individual
 4's second and perhaps third unit should
 have been included in the market because
 the marginal social benefit was no less
 than the cost of these units.
 The efficiency measure must be inter-
 preted with some care. In some studies
 the commissions are included as part of
 the measure while in the other studies
 they are not. Including them makes the
 measure sensitive to whether or not the
 marginal (zero profit) traces are made,
 thereby capturing one aspect of effi-
 ciency.4 On the other hand, the commis-
 sion seems to have no natural economic
 interpretation.
 The efficiency measure is also sensitive
 to the shapes of the curves as are all sur-
 plus measures. Suppose, for example, the
 first unit redemption values are increased
 by a factor of ten and the first unit mar-
 ginal costs are reduced to zero. Because
 these units will almost surely trade and
 now constitute a large proportion of the
 surplus, the system efficiency would in-
 crease for any expected pattern of trading.
 Thus, by adjusting the level of the base
 profit potential with intramarginal units
 that will almost certainly trade, the abso-
 lute efficiency levels can be influenced.
 A similar possibility exists with the allo-
 cation of redemption values across in-
 dividuals. Suppose the two redemption
 values of $.75 were held by a third and
 fourth individual who have the right to
 buy only the one unit. If either of these
 two individuals make a trade, efficiency
 drops. Since they have only one (ineffi-
 cient) unit to trade, they stand ready to
 trade and will trade should the price ever
 4Notice that without a commission the marginal
 trades under the conditions of Figure 2 may not be
 made. There are no gains from an exchange of the
 third unit of one and three for example.
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 "wander" down in that range. Thus, these
 units seem to have more opportunity to
 be traded than when they are held as the
 fourth unit by the original two traders.
 In the latter case, inefficient trading can
 occur only if the price wanders low
 enough after an individual has traded
 three units.
 Other special problems with efficiency
 measures occur in the case of uncertainty.
 Thus far, experiments involving risk have
 had only a limited relevance to the indus-
 trial organization literature and will not
 be reviewed here (Plott and Shyam Sun-
 der, 1982). The important point is that
 comparisons of efficiencies across markets
 with different economic parameters must
 be treated with care. If the underlying
 economic parameters are held constant
 and the institutions alone are changed, the
 efficiency comparison has a more solid ba-
 sis.
 II. Competitive Market Models
 A. Auction Markets
 The competitive model seems to work
 best when markets are organized as oral
 double auctions. Oral auction markets are
 characterized by public bids (offers) to buy
 (sell) units and the freedom of any partici-
 pant to accept terms which (s)he wishes.
 Several variants exist depending upon the
 length of time or circumstances under
 which a bid (offer) remains outstanding,
 whether the bid (offer) is made orally or
 logged through a computer, the roll of the
 specialist's "book," etc.5
 The overwhelming result is that these
 markets converge to the competitive
 equilibrium even with very few traders.
 Figure 3, which shows the price of every
 sale in the order in which it occurred, is
 typical. Each period represents a market
 day with a given demand and supply. The
 competitive equilibrium is $2 with a vol-
 ume per period of eight contracts. As mar-
 ket days are replicated under identical
 conditions, prices tend to converge to the
 competitive equilibrium. Efficiency levels
 tend to converge to near 100 percent. If
 a change in parameters occurs, such as a
 shift in demand or supply, the prices con-
 verge to the new equilibrium after two
 or three periods.
 As long as the industrial structure has
 a few buyers and sellers, these conver-
 gence and efficiency properties appear to
 be independent of the basic economic
 conditions. Different shapes of demands
 and supplies as systematically examined
 by Smith (1962, 1965, 1976a) yield no sub-
 stantial differences. The variations ex-
 plored covered various cases of demand
 elasticity and nonlinearity. In Smith (1965)
 a completely inelastic (in the relevant
 range) demand was used along with a fixed
 supply (greater than the quantity de-
 manded). In all cases, after a few periods,
 the market performance was close to that
 predicted by the competitive model.
 Basic economic conditions do seem to
 influence the direction of convergence to
 equilibrium, and thus the distribution of
 income and profit. The path to equilib-
 rium seems to be from above (below) if
 consumer's (producer's) surplus is greater
 than producer's (consumer's) surplus
 (Smith and A. W. Williams, forthcoming).
 Thus, one might expect that markets with
 relatively steep demands and reasonably
 flat supplies, record somewhat elevated
 profits for the sellers relative to the com-
 petitive equilibrium. These profits would
 accrue at disequilibrium trades and so the
 phenomenon would also be accompanied
 by falling prices. If the industry has been
 5Typically bids are tendered verbally. An auc-
 tioneer, upon hearing a bid (offer) writes the bid
 (offer) and the index of the agent on the chalkboard.
 The bid (offer) is repeated verbally and the floor is
 then open for new bids and offers. Only the last bid
 and offer are standing and they remain standing until
 accepted, cancelled or replaced. Under "New York
 rules" a replacing bid or offer must be an improve-
 ment upon the standing bid or offer. Acceptance
 can occur at any time.
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 Price Experiment 1(i) Experiment 2(i)
 $3.00 S
 2.50 -$2.50
 2.00 -2.00
 1.50 1.50 - Trading Period Trading Period
 D 1 2 1314 5 1 2 3 4IA 1.00 D 2 D
 2 246 2468 246824682468 2468246 2468246 246
 0.50 Transaction Number Transaction Number
 0 4 8 12 Quantity
 S Experiment 1(ii) Experiment 2(ii)
 $3.00 S A
 2.50 $ 2.50 [
 2.00 2.00 t
 L 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
 1.00 1.50 [ 1 TaigProL 1 Trading PerIod 1.00 D 24682468246824682468 2468 2468246824682468
 0.50 - Transaction Number Transaction Number
 0 4 8 12 Quantity
 Figure 3. Oral Double-Auction Markets
 Source: Smith (? 1976a, New York University, Chart 6, p. 53. Reprinted by permission of New York University
 Press.)
 characterized by unanticipated demand
 or supply shifts, prices and profits can be
 affected. Adjustment to a new equilibrium
 takes time, and profits or losses can cer-
 tainly reflect disequilibrium trades. To
 date only one study has attempted to char-
 acterize the dynamic adjustment path
 (Smith, 1965) and the conclusions from
 this are clouded by the fact that the choice
 of the estimation technique affects the
 conclusion regarding which dynamic ad-
 justment theory Smith's data support (For-
 rest D. Nelson, 1980). No compelling the-
 ory of dynamic adjustment exists, and
 experimental studies have not yet ex-
 plored the influence of basic economic
 conditions on adjustment paths suffi-
 ciently to provide any further generaliza-
 tions.
 Figure 4 has been added to show a typi-
 cal adjustment path for an oral double auc-
 tion when producer's surplus is greater
 than consumer's surplus. The path is from
 below. If the relative surpluses were re-
 versed, the approach, according to cur-
 rently accepted hypotheses, would be
 from above. The key parameter is the sur-
 pluses, however, and not demand or sup-
 ply slopes, although in the case of linear
 functions these are obviously closely re-
 lated.
 Changes in the market institutions are
 known to influence price and profit pat-
 terns. For example, oral double auctions
This content downloaded from 131.215.225.157 on Thu, 05 Oct 2017 00:28:43 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Plott: Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics 1495
 Price
 $4.20
 3.60
 3.40? ?----- -
 3.20
 3.00
 2.80
 2.60
 2.40
 2.20
 2.00
 1.80
 1.60
 0.80
 Trading Period
 0.40 - S ~ ~~D 1 2 3 4 5 6
 0.20 - , I I I " I I I I.I _ ?. I I I L. I .I I .I J
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112 24682468 2468 24682468 2468
 Quantity Transaction Number
 Figure 4. Oral Double-Auction Market
 Source: Smith ((?)1976a, New York University, Chart 3, p. 50. Reprinted by permission of New York University
 Press.)
 conducted by computer can affect the
 speed of convergence especially with
 inexperienced participants (A. W. Wil-
 liams, 1980). However, the most dramatic
 differences in behavior within the class of
 oral auction institutions occurs with the
 one-sided auctions. The approach to equi-
 librium is from above (below) if the auc-
 tion is a one-sided bid (offer) auction. If
 buyers (sellers) can bid (offer) while sellers
 (buyers) must accept or reject without
 making counter offer (bids), then the ap-
 proach is from above (below). The distri-
 bution of income is against the side which
 articulates the terms (Smith, 1964; Plott
 and Smith, 1978). That is, if buyers bid
 while sellers make no counter offers, the
 distribution goes against the buyers. Ex-
 actly why this occurs is not known but
 some sort of "counterspeculation" seems
 to be occurring and both the dynamics
 and the performance seem to be very sim-
 ilar to the Dutch auctions to be described
 later. The "accepting" side of the market
 seems to anticipate as a group the poten-
 tial for increased (decreased) prices as
 buyers (sellers) bid (offer) in competition
 among themselves. Even though a precise
 theoretical model does not exist, notice
 the implication of the result. Sellers who
 face an oral auction institution would
 prefer that the buyers bid. To the extent
 sellers can organize themselves to com-
 pete by accepting favorable bids and not
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 making counter offers, the approach to
 equilibrium and thus profits will be influ-
 enced in their favor. Similarly, markets
 organized as oral offer markets may have
 some use as tools to counteract "unjus-
 tified market power" of sellers. It is
 important to note, however, that the
 nonmonopolized one-sided oral auctions
 examined to date have all been nearly 100
 percent efficient. The institution affects
 only the distribution of income.
 The range of market structures that has
 been systematically explored is not wide
 because the results under the oral auction
 institutions examined thus far appear to
 be almost independent of market struc-
 ture. Experiments with three and four
 sellers converge with regularity to the
 competitive equilibrium. If influences
 from market structure exist for nonmo-
 nopolized markets under the oral double
 auction, they are not so pronounced as
 to be easily detectable.
 The performance of the oral double auc-
 tion has stimulated two important types
 of basic research. The first is to gain some
 understanding of the process which
 guides the market to near the competitive
 equilibrium (David Easley and John 0.
 Ledyard, 1980; C. B. Garcia, 1981). The
 second is to design institutions which are
 even more efficient than the oral double
 auction (Smith et al., 1982; Patrick Joyce,
 1981). Perhaps as the first task advances,
 the second task will be easier.
 B. Negotiated Prices (Telephone Market)
 Negotiated price markets are those
 within which the terms of trade are pri-
 vately negotiated with each transaction.
 Experimentally these conditions have
 been implemented through a telephone
 system where buyers and sellers, each lo-
 cated in a separate office, negotiate pri-
 vately by telephone. Buyers and sellers
 can call each other and discuss terms and/
 or agree on a contract price. Contact
 among buyers or among sellers is usually
 prevented so that information about
 prices is not public. Buyers can shop
 among sellers, shopping costs are low (in
 some experiments advertising is permit-
 ted), and shopping and negotiating are the
 only sources of information.
 The first experiments of this kind were
 done by James T. Hong and Plott (1982).
 The distribution of prices from one such
 experiment is shown in Figure 5. As can
 be seen, the system begins with a wide
 variance in prices. Evidently some buyers
 are just better negotiators than others but
 the source of this (dis)advantage, whether
 they shop more (less), or make more (less)
 credible promises or threats, etc., is un-
 known.
 With time the variance shrinks. The
 mean price approaches the competitive
 equilibrium. When demand shifts (periods
 5 and 9) the prices approach the new equi-
 librium. Efficiency in these markets is in
 the 80 to 90 percent range as shown in
 the figure. Volume in the Hong and Plott
 experiments is greater than the competi-
 tive equilibrium volume. This result,
 when combined with those of Chamberlin
 (1948), suggests that poor information may
 result in sales exceeding the competitive
 equilibrium.
 Only two different industrial structures
 have been explored within this market in-
 stitution. The Hong and Plott study had
 eleven buyers of about equal size. The 22
 sellers ranged from relatively large (the
 five largest firms had 60 percent of the
 market) to relatively small sellers, some
 of whom should not be able to make trans-
 actions, according to the competitive
 model because their costs were above the
 competitive equilibrium price. The price-
 time series shows that the competitive
 model is a reasonably accurate predictor
 of equilibrium, but some marginal sellers
 were able to sell at prices above the com-
 petitive equilibrium price to buyers who
 were evidently poorly informed or did not
 choose to shop.
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 The second study by David M. Grether
 and Plott (1981) examined telephone mar-
 kets with two large sellers (each with 35
 percent of the market) and two small sell-
 ers (15 percent each). Sellers in the experi-
 ment even had accurate knowledge of the
 market demand functions. The average
 prices, shown in Figure 6, are typical of
 the general results. Similar to the Hong
 and Plott results, prices initially have a
 high variance. With time, variance is re-
 duced and the competitive equilibrium is
 approached.
 A third study by Heinz Jiirgen Cross-
 mann (1982) was not a telephone market.
 Individual negotiations took place in pri-
 vate booths. Prices and other terms of con-
 tracts were strictly private information, so
 information was less available than in tele-
 phone markets in which several shopping
 calls could be made easily. Multiple-unit
 or block trades were possible. Sellers were
 required to make binding quantity deci-
 sions prior to the opening of a market pe-
 riod. On average, prices were near the
 competitive equilibrium relative to the
 predictions of other static models. The
 smooth adjustments toward the long-run
 competitive equilibrium are not always
 present, and in some markets the move-
 ment is away from the long-run equilib-
 rium. However, in these cobweb, unsta-
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 ble markets there exist no pronounced cy-
 cles.
 C. Posted Prices
 In posted-price markets all prices are
 public and no discounts are made from
 the posted prices. Furthermore, posted
 prices are changed only after some period
 of advanced registration. In experimental
 markets the institution is implemented as
 follows. The posting agents decide be-
 tween market periods what price to post
 in the next period. Each agent makes a
 private pricing decision and submits the
 price to the experimenter. After collect-
 ing the prices the experimenter an-
 nounces all prices, and the market opens.
 No price changes from posted prices are
 allowed during a period.
 The posted-price institution has re-
 ceived more scholarly attention than any
 other. Frequently, however, those con-
 ducting the research did not view them-
 selves as engaged in a comparative institu-
 tional analysis. The original duopoly
 experiments of Hoggatt (1959) and of
 Fouraker and Siegel (1963) can be inter-
 preted as posted-price institutions as can
 almost all "market games" and "prisoner's
 dilemma" experiments. Nevertheless, it
 was not until 1978 (Plott and Smith) that
 it became recognized that the posted-
 price institution has its own independent
 effects.
 Two generalizations seem possible at
 this time. First, posted-offer (bid) markets
 tend to have higher (lower) prices than
 do oral double auction markets in that the
 adjustment to equilibrium tends to be
 from above (below) and either converges
 to equilibrium more slowly or does not
 converge at all. Secondly, efficiency tends
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 to be lower in the posted-price markets
 than in the oral double auctions.
 These tendencies were first observable
 in experiments run by Fred Williams
 (1973) who incorrectly thought they were
 due to the fact that his traders could buy
 or sell more than one unit. Previous ex-
 periments were oral auctions in which
 each subject could trade only one unit.
 Williams was interested in traders who
 controlled multiple units, but in moving
 from one type of incentive structure to
 the other he also changed the market in-
 stitution. The results of two of his experi-
 ments are shown in Figure 7. These show
 the cumulative volume of trades at each
 price (e.g., the curve indicates the number
 of trades at price P or above). Prices at
 first are removed from equilibrium ($.60),
 but with time they converge closely to it.
 Whether or not posted-price markets ever
 stabilize at the competitive equilibrium
 is an open question since not all posted-
 price markets exhibit such monotone be-
 havior as those in the figure. Certainly
 convergence does not occur within the
 number of periods that produce conver-
 gence in oral auctions.
 The Williams results were replicated by
 Plott and Smith (1978), who also demon-
 strated by conducting multiple units, oral
 auction markets, that the market institu-
 tion and not multiple units is the cause.
 The possible importance of basic market
 conditions and market structure under
 posted prices is investigated in Hoffman
 and Plott (1981) and Hong and Plott
 (1982). In the former, posted prices in
 markets with storage and speculation
 were studied. In the latter the experimen-
 tal market had thirty-three sellers, as op-
 posed to the four in all other experiments.
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 The two generalizations were observed to
 hold in all cases.
 The Plott and Smith experiments and
 many subsequent experiments allowed
 buyers to withhold purchases and play fa-
 vorites to encourage low prices. Some of
 the Williams experiments used a com-
 puter to stimulate demanders according
 to the following strategy: first, purchase
 from the low-priced seller all s(he) wished
 to sell, and then move to the next low-
 priced seller, continuing until excess de-
 mand is exhausted. One of the principal
 discoveries of Plott and Smith was that
 their demanders behaved passively (or
 purely competitively), almost exactly like
 the Williams computer. This suggests that
 one of the major features of the posted-
 price market is that the "power" of the
 nonposting side is somehow eliminated.
 Intuitively, when facing posted prices, ab-
 stinence from purchases (sales) is unlikely
 to produce more favorable terms because
 once the price is posted it cannot be
 changed until after the period is over.
 The buyer anticipations, gaming, and/or
 "counterspeculation" conjectured as im-
 portant in explaining the behavior of one-
 sided oral auctions seems to be absent in
 one-sided posted-price markets.
 D. Multiple Markets and Endogenous
 Qualities
 Experimental research on multiple
 markets which interact sequentially or
 simultaneously has proceeded slowly be-
 cause they are difficult to control and they
 are time consuming. For example, a multi-
 ple market experiment can easily require
 three hours.
 In the first multiple market experiment
 (Ross M. Miller, Plott, and Smith, 1977)
 each of two markets could be interpreted
 as a season with the possibility of carry
 forward and speculation. Production in
 period A could be carried forward to pe-
 riod B. The competitive model is an accu-
 rate model of the market behavior. The
 results have been replicated by A. W. Wil-
 liams (1979), Hoffman and Plott (1981),
 and Plott and Jonathan T. Uhl (1981)6 and
 extended to include autarchy markets,
 posted prices, and middlemen. The same
 general framework has been modified to
 study rational expectations models as ap-
 plied to the behavior of a two-period asset
 and a futures market (Forsythe, Palfrey,
 and Plott, 1982). Four simultaneous and
 interdependent (complements) markets
 have been studied in connection with the
 problem of allocating scheduled landing
 rights at the major airports (Grether, R.
 Mark Isaac, and Plott, 1979; 1981). In all
 cases multiple markets are observed con-
 verging to predictable equilibria, and the
 efficiency levels of the entire system are
 in the upper 90 percent.
 Two studies can be interpreted as bear-
 ing on the issue of endogenous products
 or product quality. The first was not moti-
 vated by industrial organization at all but
 by the rational expectations models of fi-
 nance and the possibility that securities
 markets are capable of transferring infor-
 mation about an underlying state of na-
 ture possessed by "insiders" to other,
 uninformed participants in the market
 (Plott and Sunder, 1982). The experiments
 convincingly demonstrate that this can oc-
 cur. The relationship with industrial orga-
 nization arises because the results can be
 interpreted as demonstrating the possibil-
 ity that product quality, as determined by
 an underlying state parameter, can be re-
 vealed to the uninformed through the
 competition among those who are in-
 formed. It is as though consumers buy
 from retailers who buy from a common
 producer but have different information
 about product quality.
 The second study was motivated by the
 6This study involved a slight variant of the oral
 double auction. Bids and offers were left open until
 accepted or changed. Thus, the market institutions
 were similar to an oral double auction with limit
 orders and an open book.
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 market for physicians' services, automo-
 bile mechanics, insurance, etc. (Plott and
 Louis L. Wilde, forthcoming). In all cases
 the consumer must rely on the informa-
 tion possessed by the seller who may not
 have an incentive to tell the truth. The
 markets were constructed to perform
 poorly according to the predictions of the
 standard models because the information
 transmitted was likely to be inaccurate.
 The major result was that the markets
 failed to fail. The "lemons" phenomenon
 or "overselling" of profitable services
 characteristic of market failure theory,
 was not observed. In fact, buyers did bet-
 ter by relying on the advice of sellers than
 they did when they were trained to make
 their own diagnosis. The authors conjec-
 tured that the cause of so much "truth"
 was the search behavior of buyers. With
 search a seller may conclude that the best
 policy is to give the buyer the same infor-
 mation that was given by the other sellers
 in hope that the buyer will believe the
 seller, stop searching, and make a pur-
 chase. Each seller, believing other sellers
 are offering "good" advice, then would
 have an incentive to do the same. This
 is purely conjectural, however, and the
 theory explaining the performance of this
 market remains an open question.
 III. Monopoly
 Two different types of monopoly experi-
 ments have been conducted. The first, and
 possibly the most relevant for industrial
 organization theorists, is a market that has
 a single seller with a variable supply. In
 the second case, a single seller has a fixed
 supply which is to be auctioned or other-
 wise completely sold according to some
 type of competitive bidding process.
 A. Variable Supply and Contested
 Markets
 The difference in market performance
 under oral auctions, as opposed to posted
 prices when there are several sellers, leads
 naturally to an inquiry about the case of
 a single seller. Monopoly experiments un-
 der both institutions (Smith, 1981; Smith
 and A. W. Williams, 1981a) provide a dra-
 matic demonstration of the importance of
 both market structure and the institu-
 tional environment in determining mar-
 ket performance.
 Monopoly can definitely cause prices to
 diverge from the competitive equilib-
 rium. However, when the market is orga-
 nized as an oral double auction, the stan-
 dard monopoly model does not do so well.
 There is a strong tendency for prices to
 erode away from the monopoly equilib-
 rium price. On occasion, in Smith's experi-
 ments the prices actually approached the
 competitive equilibrium. The data are suf-
 ficiently mixed and the number of obser-
 vations are so small that we cannot deter-
 mine which model, the monopoly model
 or the pure competitive model, will be
 the easiest to modify to capture the behav-
 ior for monopolized oral double auctions.
 Figure 8 reproduces the time series from
 a particularly interesting experiment. It
 illustrates the difficulty of reaching any
 general conclusions about the compara-
 tive accuracy of the models. Prices start
 high near the monopoly price, erode to
 the competitive equilibrium, return to the
 high levels, and begin to erode again. For
 the most part volume is closer to the mo-
 nopoly level of five than to the competi-
 tive level of eight units. This interesting
 behavior seems to be attributable to the
 considerable power of buyers in this insti-
 tution. Perhaps by "counterspeculation"
 they tend to withhold purchases and force
 prices down when facing a monopolist.
 Exactly what coordinates this action is un-
 known (these buyers cannot communicate
 except through bids and offers) but, as will
 be shown below, certain institutions seem
 to prevent it and therefore help the mo-
 nopolist.
 In contrast, in posted-price (offer) mar-
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 Figure 8. Double-Auction Monopoly
 Pm = monopoly price
 P1 = competitive price
 Source: Smith (@1981, Purdue Research Foundation, Chart 3, p. 91).
 kets a different picture emerges in the
 case of monopoly. When the monopolists
 post prices, market behavior is more accu-
 rately captured by monopoly theory. The
 results of one experiment are in Figure
 9. This monopolist adjusts prices to mea-
 sure demand. The measurements are ac-
 curate because under the posted prices
 the effects of buyer "counterspeculation"
 seem not so severe and so demand gets
 revealed at each price.7 The monopolist
 ascertains the profit at each price, sets
 price at the monopoly level, and leaves
 it there. Volume stays at the monopoly
 level.
 Compared to the oral auction, the
 posted-offer markets tend to be mechani-
 cal. These data suggest that monopolists
 have a vested interest in having some vari-
 ant of posted-offer institutions. Of course
 the dual is that customers would prefer
 the oral double auction or the posted-bid
 institution, both of which result in lower
 prices in experimental markets. Obviously
 such results are not sufficiently well under-
 stood to serve as the sole basis for public
 utility regulation reform but they cer-
 tainly suggest some hitherto unappreci-
 ated potential for market institutions in
 this regard.
 A limited study of natural monopolies
 by Don Coursey, Isaac, and Smith (1981)
 provides new evidence that "contestable"
 markets might also provide a form of mar-
 ket control of monopoly. Ten markets
 were created, each of which had declining
 costs conditions theoretically sufficient for
 the emergence of natural monopolies.
 Supply technology at the individual firm
 7I do not intend to imply that "counterspecula-
 tion" is absent.
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 level was such that marginal and average
 costs declined for ten units, after which
 further increased supply was impossible.
 Demand price was above average cost
 through the tenth unit where it was $.12
 above the average cost of a firm producing
 ten units and $1.00 below the average cost
 of a firm producing one unit. A monopolist
 would theoretically provide six units. Co-
 operating duopolists without side pay-
 ments would provide two units each. Price
 was above marginal cost at the eleventh
 unit. The market demand was generated
 by five equal-sized but not identical buy-
 ers. Units were "sold to order" with no
 fixed cost, setup cost, or inventories.
 Four of the ten markets were supplied
 by a single monopolist. The other six had
 two potential and identical suppliers.
 Each supplier posted a price at the begin-
 ning of the period and a nonzero quantity.
 The market institution required the seller
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 TABLE 1
 PARAMETERS AND DATA FROM PROTECTED
 MONOPOLY AND CONTESTED MONOPOLY
 Parameters Period 18 of All Markets
 Protected Contested
 Monopoly Monopoly
 Monopoly Competitive (Average from (Average from
 Variable Model Model Four Markets) Six Markets)
 Price $1.12 $0 to $.12 $1.05 $.182
 Quantity 6 10 5 9.3
 Efficiency 60% 100% 49% 85.5%
 Source: Coursey, Isaac and Smith (1981).
 to sell to all buyers requesting units at the
 posted price until the posted quantity was
 exhausted, whereupon the seller could sell
 no more. The posted prices were publicly
 announced and buyers, given random ac-
 cess to the market, were free to choose
 the seller they wanted. Purchases were
 known only to the buyer and seller in-
 volved.
 The results are in Table 1. As can be
 seen, the behavior of the posted monopoly
 is modeled by the monopoly model rather
 than the competitive model. Coursey,
 Isaac, and Smith conjecture that the error
 of the model is due to buyer "counter-
 speculation." The six markets with con-
 testable monopolies were more accurately
 modeled by the competitive model. In
 contestable markets monopoly actually
 existed in all but ten of the one hundred
 six total number of periods observed. The
 monopolist changed from period to pe-
 riod, however, depending upon which po-
 tential supplier posted the lowest price.
 These results are only an initial probe
 into the behavior of contestable markets.
 Clearly the contestants have an interest
 in mechanisms which would restrict the
 quantity that each offered to the market.
 Perhaps by implementing institutions or
 practices which make the quantities sub-
 mitted public, along with the market de-
 mand function and individual sales vol-
 umes, sellers will be able to coordinate
 decisions in a tacit collusion. Obviously
 such open questions can be addressed by
 further experimentation.
 B. Fixed Supply
 Industrial organization theory has tra-
 ditionally been focused on the case of vari-
 able supply. Such focus is understandable
 because if the supply is fixed, the efficiency
 implications of monopoly are nonexistent.
 In the absence of price discrimination, a
 monopolized market with a fixed supply
 is exactly like a competitive market ac-
 cording to textbook theory. Nevertheless,
 the fixed supply case is of interest. It is
 one part (marketing the supply) in a two-
 part (determining supply) monopoly deci-
 sion process. Moreover, fixed supplies (or
 demands) and competitive bidding are
 frequently used by government to allo-
 cate public resources (e.g., oil leases) or
 to procure public goods (e.g., weapons).
 The first sealed-bid experiments with
 many bidders were conducted by Smith
 (1967). These experiments were moti-
 vated by a controversy about the market-
 ing of United States Treasury bonds. The
 Treasury uses a sealed-bid discriminative
 auction. If Q units are to be sold, they
 are sold to the Q highest bidders at a price
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 equal to the bid. Critics of the Treasury
 believed that a sealed-bid one-price auc-
 tion would generate more money. In the
 one-price auction the Q units are sold to
 the Q highest bidders, but all bidders
 would pay the same price and this price
 would equal the Qth highest bid or the
 (Q + 1)th highest depending upon the
 rules. A more recent problem regarding
 methods of allocating the right to land at
 four of the nation's busiest airports again
 focused research on the properties of
 these two type of auctions (Grether, Isaac,
 and Plott, 1981).
 Smith examined a market in which lot-
 teries were auctioned. Meyer W. Belovicz
 (1979), using this same type of market, ex-
 plored extensively the principal hypothe-
 sis which emerged from Smith that the
 relative revenue-generating capabilities
 of the two auction institutions depended
 critically upon the magnitude of excess
 demand. The results emerging from that
 study are mixed.
 The methodology was changed in Gary
 J. Miller and Plott (forthcoming) and in
 James C. Cox, Smith, and James M. Walker
 (1981) to one in which the personal value
 of the object was known with certainty
 but the value to other bidders was un-
 known. In the G. J. Miller and Plott study,
 bidders could purchase more than one
 unit, aggregate demand was stationary for
 many periods (but subject to an occasional
 shift), and individual demands were ro-
 tated each period in a manner which pre-
 served aggregate demand but changed
 each individual demand. In the latter,
 bidders could purchase only one unit,
 redemption values were generated
 randomly each period, and only the
 discriminative auction was studied.
 Both of these studies provide support
 for Nash equilibrium bidding models
 when there are several (three or four) bid-
 ders; that is, an equilibrium identified as
 one in which each individual is optimizing
 given the actions of every other individ-
 ual. The G. J. Miller and Plott study sug-
 gests that the relative revenue-generating
 capabilities of the two types of auctions
 depend upon demand elasticity with dis-
 criminative auctions generating more rev-
 enue when demand is relatively inelastic
 and one-price auctions generating more
 revenue when demand is relatively elas-
 tic. In part, this is due to the weight of
 "disequilibrium" auctions. After conver-
 gence takes place, they generate about
 the same revenue. These results are repli-
 cated in the study by Grether, Isaac, and
 Plott (1981).
 Figure 10 taken from G. J. Miller and
 Plott (forthcoming) illustrates the point.
 The limit price function is the curve LOL.
 The Nash equilibrium bidding curve is the
 line POL for the discriminative auction
 and it is LOL for the one-price auction
 when there is some uncertainty. The ac-
 tual bids for the first period under a dis-
 criminative auction are as shown by dd.
 Under one-price auctions the distribution
 of bids is about the same for the first pe-
 riod. Under the one-price auction the dis-
 tribution of bids approaches the limit
 price function LOL after several periods
 so the price is P. The distribution of ac-
 tual bids under the discriminative auction
 in the tenth period is shown. Since the
 area A is greater than the area B, the reve-
 nue under the discriminative auction is
 greater in this period.
 Single unit auctions have been the sub-
 ject of several papers. The market struc-
 ture differs from the studies above in that
 individual valuations are drawn at random
 each period so that the market demand
 as well as individual demands are not sta-
 tionary. The market institutions examined
 are the English auction, the Dutch auc-
 tion,8 first price sealed-bid auction, and
 the second price sealed-bid auction. Theo-
 8 Prices start high and move downward in fixed
 intervals. The bidder who first stops the downward
 price movement purchases the object at the price.
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 Source: Miller and Plott, forthcoming.
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 retically (Nash bidding hypothesis) the En-
 glish and the second price auction are
 equivalent and the Dutch and the first
 price auction are equivalent in terms of
 prices and efficiency. Many experiments
 with these auctions (Vicki M. Coppinger,
 Smith, and Jon A. Titus, 1980; Cox, Bruce
 Roberson, and Smith, forthcoming) indi-
 cate that the English and second price
 auctions behave substantially the same,
 and prices and efficiencies of these two
 exceed those of the other two. The Dutch
 and first price auction are not the same,
 with prices and efficiency of the latter
 greater. Cox, Roberson, and Smith are
 able to reject the hypothesis of Nash equi-
 librium behavior with identical utility
 functions and have been exploring the ap-
 plications of models with variable risk
 preferences.
 The exploration of sealed-bid institu-
 tions is initiated along a different dimen-
 sion by Thomas R. Palfrey (1981; forth-
 coming). The question is whether a
 monopolist who has several different ob-
 jects to sell by a first price sealed-bid auc-
 tion is better off by selling them separately
 or by bundling them together and selling
 the packages. With few bidders, bundling
 is profitable, but as the number of bidders
 increases, the advantage of bundling over
 separate auctions decreases.
 IV. Oligopoly
 A polar case of cartel theory is monop-
 oly, so in a sense the results of a perfectly
 functioning cartel were reviewed in the
 previous section. A principal conclusion
 was that the performance of a monopoly
 (perfect cartel) market is substantially af-
 fected by the marketing institutions. Be-
 cause this result carries over so strongly
 to the case of "imperfect" cartels, the re-
 view is organized according to the market
 institutions as opposed to other variables
 such as number of agents in the market,
 the size of agents, or demand elasticity.
 A. Oral Auction Markets
 Within oral auction markets two types
 of situations have been studied: an "obvi-
 ous" harmony of interest and explicit con-
 spiracy. Market participants almost always
 recognize a harmony of interest and this
 recognition can be identified in the mar-
 ket signals which occur almost constantly
 in oral double auctions. After a contract,
 when the market is open for bids or offers,
 the bidding will sometimes start with a
 clearly unacceptable bid or offer (e.g., a
 bid of one cent or something far below
 any previously accepted price, or an offer
 from two to ten times higher than any
 previously accepted price). Such bids (of-
 fers) are often followed by similar bids (of-
 fers) from other buyers (sellers) who are
 indicating a willingness to keep offers low
 (high). When this happens, the other side
 of the market tends not to be passive. Such
 "outrageous" terms are frequently an-
 swered by equally ridiculous terms from
 the other side which is indicating that it
 too has that strategy available. Even when
 there is no answer, the terms of such high
 bids or offers are not accepted, as the
 other side simply waits (counterspecu-
 lates). Competition slowly works the terms
 into the previously accepted range. Sig-
 nals such as these never seem to work to
 affect prices in the double auction institu-
 tion or if they do the effectiveness is not
 immediately obvious.
 In some experiments a harmony of in-
 terest is easily recognizable. In studies by
 R. M. Miller, Plott, and Smith (1977);
 F. Williams (1973); and Hoffman and Plott
 (1981) the markets had two speculators
 who could purchase units in one period
 (period A) and sell them in the next period
 (period B). These two individuals were the
 only agents who had the ability to buy
 units and carry them forward. They had
 a clear interest in maintaining a low price
 in period A and a high price in period
 B. In spite of this recognizable interest
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 and the fact that only two agents had such
 powers, the market behavior is modeled
 well by an intertemporal competitive
 equilibrium.
 The point is made somewhat more
 forcefully in Plott and Uhl (1981). In these
 markets four middlemen had the capacity
 to buy in one market in which they were
 the only buyers and sell in a physically
 separated market in which they were the
 only sellers. Unlike the speculation experi-
 ments in which all participants heard all
 bids, offers, and contracts, in the Plott and
 Uhl markets the initial sellers were one
 group of people who saw the action in
 the primary market and the final purchas-
 ers were a different group of people who
 saw only the action in the secondary mar-
 ket which was physically removed from
 the first. Both the harmony of interest and
 the collective power of the middlemen
 were obvious, but explicit conspiracy was
 not possible since middlemen were never
 allowed to speak directly to each other.
 Nevertheless, the competitive model fits
 the data closely.9
 In two studies, focal points were given
 the opportunity to operate as collusive de-
 vices. In R. Mark Isaac and Plott (1981b)
 and in Smith and A. W. Williams (1981b)
 price ceilings (floors) were imposed
 slightly above (below) the equilibrium. A
 theory is sometimes advanced (Frederic
 M. Scherer, 1970, pp. 179-82) that such
 controls act as a focal point and thereby
 facilitate tacit collusion. In the oral double
 auction markets reported in these studies
 there is absolutely no support at all for
 the theory that nonbinding controls oper-
 ate that way. If anything, the opposite is
 true. A ceiling (floor) that is nonbinding
 according to competitive theory tends to
 lower (increase) prices.
 Private, pre-period meetings by one
 side of the market were studied by Isaac
 and Plott (1981a) as a facilitating practice
 under the oral double auction institution.
 Four sellers (buyers) were allowed to talk
 freely between periods, while the buyers
 (sellers) left the room to get the next peri-
 od's demand (cost) functions. Side pay-
 ments and profit sharing were not allowed
 and discussions of such schemes were pro-
 hibited.
 The study asked the following ques-
 tions: Do traders discuss collusion when
 given the opportunity? Can the traders
 formulate some sort of agreement? Once
 formulated, do they stick to it? Can the
 consequences of the conspiracy be de-
 tected in the market performance?
 The answer to the first two questions
 is yes. These traders discussed conspiracy
 almost immediately and they had no diffi-
 culty in articulating an agreement. The
 answers to the second two are not without
 qualification. Data in Figure 11 provide
 a comparison with the oral double auction
 when no collusion is present (the first
 three experiments, I.P.I, I.P.II, and I.P.III)
 with those in which there is a seller's con-
 spiracy (the fourth and fifth indexed as I
 and II) and a buyer's conspiracy (the sixth
 and seventh indexed as III and IV). The
 top charts are the average prices each pe-
 riod. The middle charts are the per period
 volumes, and the bottom charts are the
 efficiencies.
 In order to see the effects, it is important
 to notice the near monotone convergence
 of all three measures in the first three non-
 conspiratorial markets. Prices, volume,
 and efficiency-all three move monotoni-
 cally to the competitive equilibrium lev-
 els. This does not happen in the conspiracy
 markets. In each of the four experiments
 with conspiracy, with the possible excep-
 tion of experiment III, at least one of these
 9 In still another study (Plott and Louis L. Wilde,
 forthcoming) sellers as a group (four sellers) knew
 they could collectively increase demand in the same
 sense that physicians, automobile mechanics, and
 other professionals can influence demand. The data
 give no support at all for collusion models.
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 Figure 11. Average Price, Volume, and Efficiency Per Period
 Source: Isaac and Plott (1981a, Figure 2, p. 10)
 measures exhibits some erratic behavior
 in the sense of a "pronounced" movement
 away from competitive equilibrium. In
 this sense the conspiracy might be detect-
 able from market data, but Experiment
 III indicates the difficulty. Notice in ex-
 periment III there is a strong tendency
 toward the competitive levels even
 though there is an active conspiracy.
 Figure 12 will help explain what is hap-
 pening. Shown there is the sequence of
 bids, offers, and contracts from experi-
 ment III. This experiment involved the
 dramatic reduction in prices in period 4
 as a result of a successful buyer's conspir-
 acy.
 Some general discussion began after period 3.
 Note that, unlike period 3, the buyers in period
 4 did not rush to accept high seller offers. In
 period 3, five of the first six trades were offers
 between 83 cents and 88 cents. In period 4,
 no offers were accepted until they reached 73
 cents. In period 5, the tenth bid was at 72 cents.
 Between periods 5 and 6 the [buyers]'0 agreed
 to try to hold the price at 71 cents. In period
 6, the first twenty-seven bids were all either
 at 70 cents or 71 cents, with several intervening
 offers at 72 cents ignored. The twenty-eighth
 bid broke the agreement, and there were ten
 immediate trades at 72 cents [Isaac and Plott,
 1981a, p. 18].
 Of particular interest in this context are
 the high offers in period 5. These are inter-
 preted as signals by sellers as an attempt
 to get other sellers to hold out. Fre-
 quently, however, they are made by sell-
 ers who have already sold and now have
 only high cost units which they do not
 expect to sell. The cost of signaling to
 them is low. Nevertheless, the fact that
 the nonconspirators are not simply passive
 is obvious.
 The difficulty these conspirators have in
 substantially affecting market conduct
 10 This corrects an error in the original paper (Isaac
 and Plott, 1981a) in which the word "sellers" was
 used instead of the correct word, "buyers."
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 seems to be related to the market institu-
 tional environment. As the Smith results
 reviewed above demonstrate, even a per-
 fect conspiracy (monopoly) has difficulty
 in the double auction. When one adds this
 property of auction markets to the fact
 that oligopolists can have difficulty in
 achieving coordination even under the
 most favorable conditions, perhaps it is
 not surprising that the market structure
 in the Isaac and Plott experiments (four
 buyers and four sellers) would make suc-
 cessful conspiracy difficult.
 B. Privately Negotiated Prices
 The only nonconspiratorial oligopoly
 markets that have been studied experi-
 mentally in which prices are privately
 negotiated are those in the Grether and
 Plott (1981) study. In these markets de-
 mand was relatively inelastic. The supply
 condition was one of excess capacity at a
 constant cost over the relevant ranges.
 The market contained several similarly
 sized buyers, two large sellers, and two
 very small sellers. No entry was possible.
 All contracts were negotiated and exe-
 cuted privately by telephone.
 In these markets each buyer and seller
 was located in a private office. Buyers had
 the phone numbers of sellers but not other
 buyers, and sellers had the phone num-
 bers of buyers and not other sellers. Thus
 there was no possibility of conspiracy. In
 addition, phone calls were privately moni-
 tored through a master switchboard in a
 secretarial pool as a further control. Sub-
 jects were told that side payments or dis-
 cussions of side payments in any form (e.g.,
 physical threats) were prohibited and that
 if any were detected, the experiment
 would be terminated immediately.
 In all other respects these markets were
 similar to those conducted under oral auc-
 tion institutions. The time periods were
 longer (ten to fifteen minutes). As might
 be expected, the volume in a telephone
 market moves more slowly because of the
 time involved with dialing, negotiating,
 etc.
 Results typical of these experiments are
 shown in Figure 6. Variance in price is
 high at first but begins to shrink over time.
 Prices, as can be seen, hang slightly above
 the competitive equilibrium. Neverthe-
 less, the market behavior is still more
 closely approximated by the competitive
 equilibrium model than any other "stan-
 dard" theory.
 Conspiracy was allowed in a study by
 Selten (1970). Negotiations took place pri-
 vately in booths. The four sellers each
 made supply quantity decisions before a
 period opened. The number of buyers var-
 ied between nine and twelve in the ten
 markets studied. Side payments, cartels,
 buyer and/or seller conversations, futures
 contracts, etc. were all permitted since
 one of the purposes was to see what prac-
 tices emerged from the marketplace. Con-
 vergence to the competitive equilibrium
 can be read into many of the price pat-
 terns but abrupt movements away from
 equilibrium exist. On average the results
 are the competitive equilibrium.
 C. Posted Prices
 The posted-price institution has been
 used in almost all oligopoly experiments.
 The practice was (perhaps inadvertently)
 introduced by Hoggatt (1959) and by Four-
 aker and Siegel (1963). In the Fouraker
 and Siegel experiments each subject seller
 was given a profit table indicating profits
 as a function of own price and the compet-
 itor's price. Hoggatt used a mathematical
 demand function to determine revenues.
 In both cases the sellers, during a period,
 chose only a single price and the decision
 was irrevocable. Since a fixed revenue
 function or profit function was provided,
 the procedures implicitly assumed that
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 TABLE 2
 FOURAKER AND SIEGEL PROFIT TABLE
 Profit When Profit When Loss When I
 Price I Have the I Am Tied Have the
 Bid Lower Price for Low Price Higher Price
 $0.5 $.13 $.00 $ -
 1.0 .35 .11 -.25
 1.5 .53 .20 -.25
 2.0 .67 .27 -.25
 2.5 .77 .32 -.25
 3.0 .83 .35 -.25
 3.5 .85 .36 -.25
 4.0 .83 .35 -.25
 4.5 .77 .32 -.25
 5.0 .27 -.2
 Source: Murphy (1966, Item 1, p. 308).
 buyers do not counterspeculate and there-
 fore behave "passively" as under the
 posted-price institution. Thus, the results
 seem to be interpreted most appropri-
 ately within that classification.
 Two different demand structures were
 used in these early experiments. In one
 series of experiments Fouraker and Siegel
 used a homogeneous product in the sense
 that a price above a competitor's resulted
 in a small loss. This reflects a primary in-
 terest of the experimenters in the Ber-
 trand model of price determination as op-
 posed to Cournot.11 On the other hand,
 Hoggatt used individual demand func-
 tions for sellers which responded nega-
 tively if a competitor lowered prices, but
 volume for the high price seller did not
 adjust discontinuously to zero. Sauermann
 and Selten used a profit table based on
 quantity decisions. Both reflect an interest
 in the Cournot model. Fouraker and Sie-
 gel also conducted a series of experiments
 in which subjects each chose a quantity.
 Once the total quantity supplied was
 known, the experimenter would choose
 a price according to a predetermined de-
 mand schedule. All subjects then sold
 their chosen quantity at this price. The
 discussion below reviews the homoge-
 neous case first.
 In the Fouraker and Siegel "homoge-
 neous commodity" design each competi-
 tor is given the profit table shown as Table
 2 which is held constant for the duration
 of several periods. Use of a profit table
 implies that the market demand function
 is known with certainty (unlike experi-
 ments discussed above). Prices above a
 competitor's price result in no sales and
 a small loss. This property leads to the in-
 terpretation that the commodity is homo-
 geneous. Cost conditions are such that
 zero profits were earned at the competi-
 tive equilibrium as shown. (In a feature
 added by James L. Murphy, 1966, price
 levels below this involved a loss for all
 agents.) The economic interpretation
 would be one of no rents, and one conse-
 quence of this lack of "producer surplus"
 is that prices must necessarily approach
 the competitive equilibrium from above.
 An important basic economic condition of
 " The Bertrand model assumes all buyers will
 instantaneously shift to the lowest priced seller so
 unilateral price changes induce substantial volume
 shifts among competitors. The Cournot model as-
 sumes that all competitors necessarily charge the
 same price but a price cutter absorbs all new market
 volume induced by overall lower prices (Lester Tel-
 ser, 1972, pp. 152-53).
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 these experiments was the symmetry of
 the payoff functions, thus implying some-
 thing about similarity of costs (for the ho-
 mogeneous product experiment the inter-
 pretation would be that all costs are
 constant at zero). Market structures were
 primarily duopolies but triopolies were
 also studied.
 The primarily institutional variable
 aside from the posted price, involved the
 amount of knowledge available to agents.
 Under the Fouraker and Siegel complete
 information, the public information was
 that all agents knew all past price choices
 and profits of all other agents. In the in-
 complete information condition, the pub-
 lic information was that profits were un-
 known and an agent only knew at the end
 of a period whether his price was higher
 or lower than the competitor's.
 If one uses as the market price the low-
 est price in the market (the price at which
 all trades takes place) then Fouraker and
 Siegel discovered a strong tendency for
 prices to converge toward the competi-
 tive equilibrium. In the case of incomplete
 information by the fourteenth period the
 competitive equilibrium price prevailed
 in eleven of seventeen markets and was
 at the neighboring price (the price nearest
 the competitive equilibrium) in six other
 cases. In the remaining experiment, the
 price was closer to the competitive equi-
 librium than to the joint maximum.
 The complete information markets
 were characterized by a higher variance
 in behavior. Six of these markets were at
 the competitive equilibrium by the four-
 teenth period. Three more were at the
 neighboring price. Four were exactly mid-
 way between the competitive price and
 the joint maximum, and the other four
 were either at the joint maximum (two)
 or at the neighboring price (two). The ad-
 ditional information provided in this mar-
 ket setting tended to facilitate collusive
 behavior. Notice that the importance of
 the information is connected in some way
 to the market setting because public infor-
 mation (other than profits) in the oral auc-
 tion facilitates no collusion at all.
 Fouraker and Siegel also examined tri-
 opoly. All of the eleven markets operating
 under incomplete information converged
 by the fourteenth period to the competi-
 tive equilibrium. All but one of the ten
 markets operating under complete infor-
 mation also converged to the competitive
 equilibrium. Thus, in these experiments
 the number of sellers was an important
 variable when information was complete.
 In a study by James L. Murphy (1966)
 a similar decay process was observed in
 duopolies operating under the incomplete
 information condition. In general, how-
 ever, he found the decay process to be
 slower with prices tending to hang some-
 what higher above the competitive equi-
 librium than in the Fouraker and Siegel
 experiments. By the fourteenth period,
 thirteen of seventeen duopoly markets
 were closer to the competitive equilib-
 rium than to the joint maximum. The
 Murphy markets continued ten periods
 beyond the fourteenth period where the
 Fouraker and Siegel markets stopped. At
 the end of the twenty-fourth period,
 eleven of the seventeen markets were
 closer to the competitive equilibrium than
 the joint maximum and five were exactly
 at the joint maximum. The variance across
 periods within markets decreased. Thus
 markets either converged to the joint
 maximum or the competitive equilibrium,
 given more time, and the additional time
 enhanced the tendency to the former.
 The Murphy experiments involved
 three changes from the Fouraker and Sie-
 gel experiments. More price choices were
 available. Prices below the competitive
 equilibrium were possible with losses re-
 sulting in prices in that range and of
 course the experimenter and subject pools
 differed. Murphy conducted only incom-
 plete information markets with his own
 payoff charts. By comparing the rate of
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 cooperation with Fouraker and Siegel, he
 concluded that the threat of losses ac-
 counts for the higher rate. This conclusion
 is somewhat premature without a con-
 trolled experiment using the Fouraker
 and Siegel payoffs along with the Murphy
 payoff in the same subject pool and design.
 Rates of cooperation may well differ
 slightly from subject pool to subject pool
 and that might account for the differences
 with Fouraker and Siegel. Convergence
 to the joint maximum was not monotone.
 Instead, almost all of the duopolies experi-
 enced the decay to the competitive equi-
 librium at first and then, after several peri-
 ods, prices began to drift upwards for
 those that ultimately converged to the
 joint maximum.
 Presumably this "cooperative" phe-
 nomenon in duopolies operating under
 these conditions is facilitated by many tri-
 als and experience. The latter was ex-
 plored extensively by Rolf Stoecker (1980)
 within the same parametric environment
 as Murphy but with complete informa-
 tion. Rather than many periods of a single
 market, Stoecker allowed individuals to
 obtain experience from different markets
 of ten periods each. Thirty-seven out of
 fifty duopoly markets managed substantial
 cooperation (at or near the joint maxi-
 mum). None of the remainder exhibited
 the property of monotonic convergence
 to the competitive equilibrium. Jumps of
 price were common.
 The Stoecker experiments provide new
 insights into the nature and possibility of
 tacit collusion. Nineteen of the thirty-
 seven markets which attained the coordi-
 nated equilibrium near the joint maxi-
 mum did so with no signals or "learning."
 It occurred with the first price choice.
 Both competitors chose the joint maxi-
 mum, and for the most part the systems
 stayed there. This behavior was prevalent
 among duopolists with previous experi-
 ence. Thus, in this context, in which the
 harmony of interest could be clearly ascer-
 tained with no room for ambiguity or con-
 fusion, some duopolies needed no means
 of communicating intentions at all. Tacit
 collusion occurred immediately. For a
 subset (eighteen) of these fifty duopolies
 the joint maximum was not the individual
 maximum given equal prices. Of these,
 thirteen achieved stable equilibrium near
 the joint maximum and of the thirteen
 there were four which attained the equi-
 librium with the first move. Since these
 duopolists had twenty prices to choose
 from, it would be difficult to ascribe these
 coordinated actions to chance.
 In Fouraker and Siegel, and in Stoecker
 both of the basic economic conditions of
 profit function symmetry (Stoecker stud-
 ied two different types of asymmetry) and
 the market structure (two, three, and five
 agents) were examined. Symmetry results
 in high market prices. Presumably this is
 because coordination is easier-the ac-
 tions of the other agents can be more
 clearly understood and there can be no
 disagreement over the joint strategies. If
 both are to charge the same price, a
 unique Pareto optimum exists. An in-
 crease in the number of firms almost al-
 ways results in a convergence of price to
 levels near the competitive equilibrium.
 However, a slight upward bias relative to
 the competitive equilibrium even when
 the number of firms is "large," appears
 to be part of the general properties of the
 posted-price institution.
 Fouraker and Siegel conducted another
 series of experiments which can be inter-
 preted as a case of nonhomogeneous
 products.12 In these markets, sellers each
 12The Fouraker-Siegel subjects saw only profits ex-
 pressed on tables as a function of the two partici-
 pants' quantity choices. While Fouraker and Siegel
 generated these functions from a market demand
 with a homogeneous product and no costs, the func-
 tions themselves are consistent with other economic
 environments. In particular, one can generate these
 same profit functions from properly selected de-
 mand functions for nonhomogeneous products and
 properly selected cost functions. Furthermore, in the
 transformed environment, choice of quantity is
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 determined a quantity interpreted as the
 number of units to be offered for sale.
 After all decisions were collected by the
 experimenter, the quantities were an-
 nounced and each subject could deter-
 mine the profits from a prepared table.
 In the complete information case, com-
 petitors knew all previous quantity
 choices and profits of each other. In the
 incomplete information condition all pre-
 vious quantity decisions of all participants
 were known to all, but each seller knew
 only his/her own profits. The fact that
 quantity decisions were known under the
 incomplete information condition induces
 an element of noncomparability between
 the homogeneous product case reviewed
 above in which price decisions were made
 and each competitor knew only who had
 the lowest price and not the price magni-
 tude.
 The results at the fourteenth period are
 summarized in Figure 13. Each market
 is categorized according to the model
 which most accurately predicts total mar-
 ket volume. As can be seen, the accuracy
 of the joint maximization or cartel model
 decreases with an increase in number of
 agents and also a reduction of information
 about the other agents' actions. Interest-
 ingly, the Cournot model as opposed to
 the competitive model seems to be most
 accurate in this "nonhomogeneous com-
 modity" case. In the homogeneous com-
 modity experiments the two models could
 not be given independent interpretations.
 Here they can and the Cournot model
 picks up much of the data. Whether this
 is the natural "upward bias" of the posted
 prices or an actual manifestation of the
 Nash equilibrium principle is still an open
 question.
 The work of James W. Friedman (1963,
 1969, 1970), Hoggatt (1959, 1967) and
 F. T. Dolbear, et al. (1968) has extended
 the posted-price research in several direc-
 tions. In these markets, products are in
 a formal sense no longer homogeneous.
 Recall, in the Fouraker and Siegel setting,
 prices higher than a competitor's result
 in a loss to the competitor with the higher
 price. Presumably this reflects the idea
 that sellers with the highest price make
 no sales and, to the extent that costs are
 incurred, must suffer a loss. In the experi-
 ments to be discussed, the competitor
 with the highest price can still make some
 profit but not as much as would be the
 case if the price were equal to or below
 the other(s). As a result of this difference
 in market conditions the information con-
 ditions can be altered. Perfect information
 means that all profit functions and past
 price choices are known. Incomplete in-
 formation means that all past prices (or
 quantities, as appropriate) are known but
 only an agent's own profit functions are
 known.
 The findings are best represented in the
 recent book by Friedman and Hoggatt
 (1980) which describes the results of sev-
 eral oligopolistic markets under varying
 parametric information conditions and
 subject experience. Relative to other ex-
 periments these are exceptionally compli-
 cated because subjects made production
 and inventory decisions along with price
 decisions. Subjects gained experience as
 in Stoecker by participating in a series of
 different markets over a long period of
 time. In addition to more refined models
 of individual decisions, two basic market
 models are compared: the joint maximum
 model and the Cournot equilibrium. The
 competitive equilibria where price equals
 marginal cost are not examined. Of
 course, the Cournot equilibrium prices
 are above these prices.
 Hoggatt and Friedman devote much ef-
 fort to developing a model of individual
 behavior. The model developed, which
 has considerable support, assumes the in-
 equivalent to choice of price. Therefore, the Four-
 aker and Siegel experiments can be interpreted as
 a case of price posting for a nonhomogeneous com-
 modity.
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 Price (?)
 2.4
 2.0 Number of Experiments
 for Which Each Model Was the Most Accurate
 Duopoly Triopoly
 Complete Incomplete Complete Incomplete
 Information Information Information Information
 1.5
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 Cournot Duopoly ---7V2* 14
 .5 _ _ Cournot riopoly 5 9
 Competitive Equilibrium
 I - I I I | I_ t ____ -- 6 2
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 Units Per Period
 Figure 13. Fouraker and Siegel Parameters and Results
 * The fraction indicates a tie between Cournot and competitive.
 dividual develops estimates of the other
 agent's pricing decisions by an extrapola-
 tion of previous decisions. The individual
 then optimizes against that estimate. The
 resulting market equilibria are reinforcing
 in a statistical sense. Cournot behavior in
 this sense is a good first approximation of
 individual behavior when tacit collusion
 is absent.
 If the markets are characterized by per-
 fect information and symmetric profit
 functions, the joint maximum is a good
 predictor for markets with up to four sell-
 ers. For the market with six sellers, prices
 dropped substantially to the Cournot
 equilibrium or just above it. If the symme-
 try is dropped or if perfect information
 is dropped,13 the number of sellers be-
 13Information in Dolbear, et al. (1968) did not have
 a measurable effect. Subsequent experiments sug-
 gest that the payoffs used in this experiment were
 so small (five cents difference in profits between
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 comes a very important treatment varia-
 ble in that an increase in the number de-
 stroys the accuracy of the joint maximum
 model. In the duopoly markets, significant
 (but less than perfect) cooperation occurs
 but, with an increase in the number of
 firms, it vanishes almost completely and
 the Cournot model is very accurate by
 comparison.
 Friedman and Hoggatt conjecture what
 Stoecker convincingly demonstrates, that
 experience makes a difference. "New and
 inexperienced faces" can cause market
 prices to deteriorate.
 Hoggatt, Friedman, and Shlomo Gill
 (1976), and Friedman and Hoggatt (1980)
 provide the only attempts to model the
 signaling phenomenon. In part, signals are
 viewed as attention getting devices. Most
 of the work is an attempt to identify a
 signal as something distinct buried in the
 masses of data of the ordinary searching
 and competing price decisions. Within the
 posted-price institution high or low prices
 have an immediate effect on profits, so
 as one might expect, signals occur rarely,
 relative to other decisions. Signals are
 identified as a type of "pulse" in which
 an abrupt change of behavior occurs for
 a brief period (a sudden large price in-
 crease or decrease) followed by a return
 to the original levels. Friedman and Hog-
 gatt have attempted to develop models
 which will relate this activity to overall
 price changes and/or price levels. As of
 this writing they have a reasonable char-
 acterization of the phenomenon but feel
 it happens so infrequently in their data
 that the implications cannot be ascer-
 tained.
 Thus, for the posted-price institution a
 pattern is emerging. The institution seems
 to foster higher prices in general. Further-
 more, under appropriate basic economic
 conditions and market structures, it can
 foster tacit collusion in the sense that the
 joint maximizing model is an accurate pre-
 dictor of pricing patterns.
 If the market institution is the posted
 price as opposed to the oral double auc-
 tion, and the market structure is duopoly,
 a completely different picture of conspir-
 acy emerges. Friedman (1967, 1970) stud-
 ied posted prices of duopolies with
 asymmetric payoff functions. Perfect in-
 formation existed in the sense that each
 competitor knew all previous price
 choices and payoffs (up to a scalar transfor-
 mation on occasion). Competitors were al-
 lowed to transmit two written messages
 before privately making a price decision.
 These messages were made in sequence
 with the same individual initiating contact
 for each of up to twenty-five periods (al-
 though most were from six to fourteen).
 In his data, collusive agreements were at-
 tained in over 75 percent of all decisions
 made, and of the collusive agreements, 75
 percent were Pareto optimal relative to
 the pair (no side payments were allowed).
 The ability to make such agreements in-
 creases with experience. Once a collusive
 agreement has been attained and success-
 fully implemented in choice behavior for
 one time, the probability of another suc-
 cessful agreement is .96.
 An attempt to study collusion under the
 posted-price institution is also found in
 Selten and Claus C. Berg (1970). Side pay-
 ments were possible with some risk that
 the payments would not be made. Each
 seller had the ability to stop the continu-
 ous time in these markets in order to make
 a price change. Other sellers were aware
 of price changes and could respond imme-
 diately. Collusive arrangements emerged,
 but not always.
 Conspiracy does have implications for
 market performance. Perhaps this is no
 surprise to those who have observed in-
 Cournot equilibrium and monopoly) that the influ-
 ence of any variables would be hard to detect. Never-
 theless, the data tend to be very close and just above
 the Cournot equilibrium and the qualitative influ-
 ence of other variables is consistent with those of
 later studies.
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 dustry for years but these studies demon-
 strate the truth of the proposition for those
 who have not had the benefit of such ob-
 servation or believe that the "competitive
 drive to defect" is so strong that collusion
 is impossible. Experiments illustrate that
 performance is strongly influenced by
 both market structure and the market in-
 stitutional environment.
 D. Markets with Advance Notification
 and Price Protection
 The recent actions taken by the Fed-
 eral Trade Commission14 have drawn at-
 tention to the market institution in the
 antiknock compound industry.15 Four in-
 dustrial practices were in dispute. First,
 customers were assured of a thirty-day ad-
 vance notice of price changes (increases).
 Secondly, prices were quoted in terms of
 delivered prices with the same price pre-
 vailing regardless of transportation costs.
 The last two were in contracts which typi-
 cally included a "price protection" clause
 which guarantees (i) that the seller will
 sell to no one at a price less than the price
 quoted the buyer and (ii) the seller will
 meet any lower price in the market or
 release the buyer from the contract.
 The market structure is characterized
 by two large sellers of equal size (approxi-
 mately 35 percent of the market each) and
 two small sellers of about equal size. A
 long-run declining demand (due to a re-
 duction in lead use in gasoline) and exist-
 ing excess capacity discourages entry.
 Eight large buyers account for about 60
 percent of the sales and many very small
 buyers account for the rest.
 Grether and Plott (1981) have explored
 markets with these properties. Each agent
 was assigned an office. Sellers were able
 to post prices by means of a digital elec-
 tronic display system such that price an-
 nouncements were made known immedi-
 ately to all market agents. Orders were
 placed through the telephone system.
 Price increases required advance notice
 and all transactions were made at adver-
 tised prices (the buyer protection clause
 which precludes all discounts). The mar-
 ket structure was as described above with
 the market demand and supply functions
 as shown in Figure 14.
 The major conclusion of this study is
 that these practices and market structure
 cause prices to be above those that would
 otherwise exist if either variable were ap-
 propriately changed. Figure 14 gives the
 averages prices during each of seventeen
 trading periods. Market institutions were
 a simple telephone market during the first
 twelve periods. As can be seen, the prices
 begin to decay toward the competitive
 equilibrium. The four disputed practices
 were imposed beginning in period 13 and
 remained through period 15. As can be
 seen, prices jump immediately to near
 those which exist at the Cournot equilib-
 rium. When the practices were removed
 (periods 16 and 17) prices immediately
 fell. These data are representative of the
 pattern of findings from ten experimental
 markets.
 The theoretical explanation of this phe-
 nomenon has some support. Advance no-
 tice given sufficiently in advance of the
 deadline for advance notification provides
 a signal to other sellers. If the notice in-
 volves a price sufficiently far in the future,
 it induces no current business loss. Only
 a single price is involved, so the signal is
 uncomplicated with minimal dimensions
 over which disagreement can occur.
 Other sellers know that if they do not in-
 crease prices before the deadline, the
 original firm will rescind the proposed
 price increase. Thus other sellers do not
 have the option of "underselling" and ac-
 quiring a larger market share. The Nash
 14 The Federal Trade Commission complaint
 against Ethyl, DuPont, PPG and Nalco Chemical
 Company (Ethyl Corporation, et al. FTC Docket No.
 9128. Complaint issued May 31, 1979).
 15 The product is added to gasoline by refiners to
 reduce knock and raise gasoline octane rating.
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 strategy for such firms is simply to match
 the proposed price if a uniform industry
 price at the higher level will increase the
 firm's profits and do nothing otherwise.
 On the downside, due to the homoge-
 neous nature of the product, if not the
 buyer's protection, price cuts will be
 matched, so the incentive to cut prices
 depends upon the anticipated share of de-
 mand increase due to lower price levels.
 This model predicts that prices will cer-
 tainly be at Cournot levels if not higher.
 These institutions seem to have an effect
 on buyers similar to the posted-price insti-
 tutions. Buyers do not anticipate discounts
 because the institutions prevent them.
 Furthermore, since any price concessions
 must be offered to all, buyers can see that
 price concessions can be costly to the
 seller and thus have less expectation of
 winning them. As a result, the buyers
 seem to have less "counterspeculation"
 than in, say, the telephone markets alone.
 Thus these institutions appear to remove
 one source of buyer pressure for reduced
 prices while at the same time easing the
 problem of price coordination for the
 seller and eliminating the advantages of
 price cuts.
 V. Defense of Experiments
 Many of the studies reviewed above
 were designed and executed to answer
 reasonably specific questions related pri-
 marily to basic science. Sometimes ap-
 plied scientists dismiss the experimental
 results and methods as being irrelevant
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 and inapplicable. Needless to say, most
 questions cannot be answered by applying
 experimental methods. The theme of this
 section is on the art of posing questions
 which can.
 The relevance of experimental methods
 rests on the proposition that laboratory
 markets are "real" markets in the sense
 that principles of economics apply there
 as well as elsewhere. Real people pursue
 real profits within the context of real rules.
 The simplicity of laboratory markets in
 comparison with naturally occurring mar-
 kets must not be confused with questions
 about their reality as markets.16
 If the reality of laboratory markets as
 markets is accepted, then the art of posing
 questions rests on an ability to make the
 study of simple special cases relevant to
 an understanding of the complex. General
 theories and models by definition apply
 to all special cases. Therefore, general the-
 ories and models should be expected to
 work in the special cases of laboratory
 markets. As models fail to capture what
 is observed in the special cases, they can
 be modified or rejected in light of experi-
 ence. The relevance of experimental
 methods is thereby established.
 Several different research strategies are
 apparent in the research reviewed in this
 paper but five will be identified here.
 1. Theory Rejection. A model may be
 so poor at capturing observed behavior
 that it may be best to consider it no further
 or to use it even if no alternative model
 is available. The original experiments by
 Smith could be viewed as a potential basis
 for rejecting the ideas of demand and sup-
 ply. If the model had not been at all accu-
 rate when applied to a simple market de-
 signed explicitly to give the model its
 "best chance," if, for example, the data
 were rectangularly distributed over the
 trading range in all periods, then it could
 be rejected as capturing none of the phe-
 nomena. However, the model worked ex-
 traordinarily well and as a result the origi-
 nal experiments were essentially ignored
 by the economics profession. Those who
 had a strong belief in principles of demand
 and supply said the results were "obvi-
 ous." Critics of demand and supply dis-
 missed the results saying that the markets
 were "rigged" so that demand and supply
 would work. When the approach is one
 of "model rejection," negative results in-
 stead of positive results are "interest-
 ing."
 2. Theory Competition. In most cases
 competing models exist and existing data
 are not an adequate basis for rejecting one
 in favor of the other. The idea, then, is
 to create simple laboratory markets which
 are special cases of markets in which the
 models are generally applied. The experi-
 ments will, hopefully, indicate which is
 more accurate in the simple cases. While
 relative accuracy in a simple case does not
 prove that the model will continue to be
 relatively accurate when applied to the
 complex case, it does provide some experi-
 ences with the models. More importantly,
 it places the burden of proof squarely on
 those who continue to advocate the "los-
 ing" model to establish why the model
 they prefer would do relatively poorly in
 simple cases but perform relatively accu-
 rately in the complex. Presumably the ar-
 guments they advance in an attempt to
 establish this result can themselves be ex-
 amined by application of additional theory
 and more complicated experiments.
 3. Model Robustness. We have seen
 that changes in the market institutional
 environment can change market perfor-
 mance. These facts were discovered as ex-
 perimenters inquired about the accuracy
 of the competitive model under alterna-
 tive institutional regimes. These were
 checks on the robustness of the model un-
 der institutional perturbations. Similarly,
 some studies have checked the robustness
 16 See Plott (1979) and Smith (forthcoming) for a
 detailed discussion.
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 of the model under parametric perturba-
 tions such as number of competitors, de-
 mand elasticity, etc. Even though no for-
 mal theory (or any theory at all) exists
 about the influence of these factors, it is
 only natural to check. Then, once an im-
 portant variable is found which was not
 anticipated by existing theory, the data
 from the experiments serve as a motiva-
 tion for the development of extensions of
 the theory to cover the new facts. The
 influence of the posted price is a good ex-
 ample. No formal theory exists yet which
 completely explains the properties of this
 institution.
 4. Measurement. When most scholars
 think of experiments, they have measure-
 ment in mind (e.g., What is the probability
 of tacit collusion? What is the speed of
 adjustment to equilibrium?). Laboratory
 experimental methods can be applied to
 these ends but none of the experiments
 above were predicated on the hypothesis
 that they were measuring numerical con-
 stants of nature. Questions of this type
 would seem to require elaborate sampling
 procedures and explicit definitions of the
 populations to which the measurement is
 to be applied. The studies above all in-
 volved hypotheses about relative behav-
 ior as opposed to numerical constants.
 5. Simulation. Another popular pre-
 conception about the function of experi-
 ments is simulation. In circumstances in
 which a policy is going to be imposed on
 a social system, simulation objectives in-
 volve an attempt to recreate the situation
 on a smaller scale in order to provide deci-
 sionmakers with some experience with
 how the situation might evolve.
 If there is no theory to indicate which
 variables are important, the complexity of
 the small situation must mirror the com-
 plexity of the large as closely as is possible.
 Furthermore, without theory to unify the
 observations, the experiment must be con-
 ducted enough times to assure the "statis-
 tical validity" of any asserted pattern in
 the results. Thus theory, even in the case
 of simulation, serves importantly to sim-
 plify the experimental process. The more
 that accepted theory can be invoked, the
 less the experimental process needs to
 "mirror" the natural analog. The ten-
 dency of scholars to reject experimental
 methods as irrelevant may be because
 they are fundamentally interested in sim-
 ulation while being unaware of the role
 of theory on the one hand and being very
 aware of the complexities of the situation
 (and the impossibility of recreating it) on
 the other hand.
 The arguments above are straightfor-
 ward, but it is easy to be pulled off track.
 Sometimes scholars use the term "real
 world" to refer to nonlaboratory processes
 and the term "artificial market" or "simu-
 lated market" to refer to laboratory mar-
 kets. Such language invites criticism by
 failing to acknowledge the argument
 above about laboratory markets being real
 markets. In addition, the language sug-
 gests that the primary test of relevance
 for laboratory market results is how
 closely the laboratory market approxi-
 mates some naturally occurring market
 thus implying that the purpose is simula-
 tion. This test neglects all of the other
 modes of learning from experiments. The
 laboratory environments provide an arena
 within which the relative accuracy of
 competing general theories can be evalu-
 ated and the poorer models rejected. Re-
 call that general theories and models of
 markets must apply to all special cases in-
 dependently of how those special cases
 compare with some other complicated
 special case which could itself be the result
 of several accidents of history. In essence,
 a demand that laboratory experiments de-
 signed to test general theories should sim-
 ulate some naturally occurring case in its
 full complexity denies the relevance of a
 study of special cases, and such a require-
 ment would pose just as many problems
 for experimental methods in the physical
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 science as it would for experimental eco-
 nomics.
 The problem of relevance can surface
 in many different forms. In the remaining
 paragraphs four of the most common
 sources of skepticism will be discussed.
 The first argument is a claim that "real"
 businessmen do not behave as do the sub-
 jects in these experiments. Stated like this
 the argument is not a criticism of experi-
 mental methods, it is a hypothesis about
 behavior in different subject pools and is
 thus a call for more experiments (with
 businessmen subjects). Similarly, argu-
 ments that the monetary amounts in-
 volved were too little (or too much) are
 simply demands for more experiments.
 The fact of the matter is, however, that
 a variety of subjects and payment levels
 have been used. The Hong and Plott
 (1982) study, for example, used employed
 adults. To date, no subject pool differences
 which bear on the reliability of economic
 theory have been reported.
 The next three arguments derive from
 the fact that naturally occurring phenom-
 ena are inherently more complex than are
 laboratory processes. The first argument
 is that the laboratory environment is arti-
 ficial. Exactly why is not articulated, but
 with this argument the word is used many
 times and preferably loudly. It probably
 results from a gestalt view that there are
 so many important variables that they
 cannot be enumerated and that they in-
 teract in ways that are necessarily pre-
 cluded in the laboratory.
 This argument, notice, is not an argu-
 ment against experimental methods in
 economics, it is an argument against
 experimental methods in general. The
 physical scientists must deal with it and
 so must the economists. Since the asser-
 tion cannot be falsified, the only answer
 lies in experimental work that has been
 helpful in generating successful models
 and points of view regarding more com-
 plex processes. As applied researchers find
 the data from experiments useful in shap-
 ing their own hypotheses and beliefs, this
 argument becomes less important.
 The second argument is more specific
 in that it notes that naturally occurring
 processes do not occur in isolation. Indus-
 tries are embedded in a larger social con-
 text. Businessmen have social relation-
 ships and friendships. They also know that
 their decisions while with one firm, may
 affect their possibilities for changing
 firms.
 This argument suggests that behavior
 in very complex environments may follow
 different laws than those which govern be-
 havior in relatively simple situations. This
 is an excellent reason for being careful in
 any attempt to extrapolate behavior from
 a laboratory to a complex industry. Notice,
 however, that it is not an argument
 against experimental methods. It is an ar-
 gument for a particular type of experi-
 ment-one in which the complexity of the
 experimental environment is gradually in-
 creased to make its characteristics more
 nearly similar to those of a given industry.
 If complications destroy the applicability
 of models, it might be possible to identify
 the precise complications which cause the
 problem and adjust the model accord-
 ingly. In a sense this program of increasing
 complexity is exactly how experiments are
 proceeding.
 The final criticism also relies on the
 complexity of naturally occurring pro-
 cesses. How is one to know if the elasticity
 of demand and costs used in an experi-
 ment or if the particular market institu-
 tion are those of the industry? If the results
 of the laboratory experiments are to be
 applied, shouldn't these be "right"? The
 answer to these types of criticisms are still
 more experiments under varying parame-
 ters. With a wide range of parameters ex-
 plored, the question collapses into a judg-
 ment about parameters and not the
 experimental methods.
 All of these arguments should make one
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 cautious about extrapolating results gen-
 erated from laboratory processes to natu-
 rally occurring processes. This type of ex-
 tension must be dealt with artfully in the
 physical sciences as well as in economics.
 It is the most difficult task that any re-
 searcher faces. Experiments are simply an
 additional source of data and experience
 that one adds to other sources in making
 judgments about how the world works.
 An easier task, involving a somewhat
 negative approach, places the burden of
 proof on those who advocate theories.
 General theories apply in special cases.
 They should therefore be expected to
 work in the simple laboratory environ-
 ments and if they do not or if a competing
 theory works better, the burden of proof
 is on the advocate to tell us exactly why
 we should not judge him to be wrong. By
 adopting this point of view, researchers
 can use data from laboratory economics
 to reduce the size of the set of competing
 ideas.
 VI. Closing Remarks
 Experimental studies demonstrate
 clearly that market institutions and prac-
 tices can influence market performance.
 Variables traditionally classified as aspects
 of market structure are also of demonstra-
 ble importance. Furthermore, rather stan-
 dard mathematical models are able to
 capture much of what can be observed
 behaviorally.
 Three models do well in predicting
 market prices and quantity: the competi-
 tive equilibrium, the Cournot model, and
 the monopoly (joint maximization) model.
 Experiments help define the conditions
 under which each of these alternative
 models apply. Some tendency exists for
 the error of a model when applied to data
 to be sensitive to structural and institu-
 tional variables (e.g., posted prices tend
 to be higher than prices under oral double
 auctions) but generally speaking, when a
 model applies, it does so with reasonable
 accuracy.
 Interestingly enough, while experimen-
 tal studies demonstrate that it is possible
 to model economic processes, they have
 also uncovered a problem in determining
 the conditions under which a model will
 be applicable. There is an interaction be-
 tween variables which has not been fully
 explained. It is not the case that competi-
 tors are capable of collusive activity when
 merely recognizing a harmony of inter-
 ests. It is also not the case that competitors
 cannot collude in the absence of direct
 communication and the enforcement of
 agreements. Competitors seem to be will-
 ing to collude (so the rivalistic hypothe-
 ses17 advanced in the early experimental
 studies can be safely dropped) but some
 market structures and institutions make
 it easy while others make it almost impos-
 sible (in the sense that successful collusion
 has never been observed). Even a mo-
 nopolist has difficulty within certain mar-
 ket institutions. Existing theory does not
 tell us exactly why this occurs, but the data
 suggest that one key is the behavior of
 the buyers. The data also suggest that mar-
 ket performance is very fragile (or "non-
 linear") with respect to underlying struc-
 tural and institutional variables and that
 "slight" changes (from four to two firms,
 or from price posting to some other insti-
 tution) can switch a market from "com-
 petitive" to "collusive" or vice versa.
 No doubt the ultimate usefulness of ex-
 perimental work will be determined by
 demonstrations that experiments provide
 insights about what one finds upon close
 examination of industries. Prosecutors and
 regulators must choose which cases to
 prosecute and what reliefs to pursue, and
 frequently the choices must be based on
 very thin data and controversial economic
 17 This hypothesis maintained that competitors will
 attempt to maximize relative profits, thereby trans-
 forming the market into a zero sum game.
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 theories. The facts which might falsify the
 theory are often impossible to obtain with-
 out undertaking the long and expensive
 process of litigation. Experiments are an
 alternative, relatively inexpensive, and
 relatively quick source of data. How these
 data will be regarded by the courts is yet
 to be determined (John B. Kirkwood,
 1981) but there seems to be no substantial
 difference between data from experimen-
 tal markets and data from other types of
 experiments. Of course, this source of data
 has one more substantial advantage. The
 fact that experiments can always be rerun
 and the validity of claims checked, places
 severe veracity constraints upon those
 who might enter such data as evidence
 in a court proceeding.
 APPENDIX
 The instructions below are typical of those used
 in the experiments reviewed. Both posted bid mar-
 ket and oral double auction organizations are in-
 cluded. These instructions are read by the experi-
 menter. The incentive forms (Figure 1) are also
 distributed. The forms are also reproduced on the
 blackboard and completed by the experimenter as
 directed by the instructions and the example in the
 instructions.
 INSTRUCTIONS
 General
 This is an experiment in the economics of market
 decision making. Various research foundations have
 provided funds for this research. The instructions
 are simple and if you follow them carefully and make
 good decisions you might earn a considerable
 amount of money which will be paid to you in cash.
 In this experiment we are going to simulate a mar-
 ket in which some of you will be buyers and some
 of you will be sellers in a sequence of market days
 or trading periods. Attached to the instructions you
 will find a sheet, labeled Buyer or Seller, which de-
 scribes the value to you of any decisions you might
 make. YOU ARE NOT TO REVEAL THIS INFOR-
 MATION TO ANYONE. It is your own private infor-
 mation.
 Specific Instructions to Buyers
 During each market period you are free to pur-
 chase from any seller or sellers as many units as you
 might want. For the first unit that you buy during
 a trading period you will receive the amount listed
 in row (1) marked 1st unit redemption value; if you
 buy a second unit you will receive the additional
 amount listed in row (5) marked 2nd unit redemp-
 tion value; etc. The profits from each purchase
 (which are yours to keep) are computed by taking
 the difference between the redemption value and
 purchase price of the unit bought. Under no condi-
 tions may you buy a unit for a price which exceeds
 the redemption value. In addition to this profit you
 will receive a 5 cent commission for each purchase.
 That is,
 [your earnings = (redemption value)
 - (purchase price) + 0.05 commission].
 Suppose for example that you buy two units and
 that your redemption value for the first unit is $200
 and for the second unit is $180. If you pay $150
 for your first unit and $160 for the second unit, your
 earnings are:
 $ earnings from 1st - 200- 150 + 0.05 = 50.05
 $ earnings from 2nd = 180- 160 + 0.05 = 20.05
 total $ earnings = 50.05 + 20.05 = 70.10.
 The blanks on the table will help you record your
 profits. The purchase price of the first unit you buy
 during the first period should be recorded on row
 (2) at the time of purchase. You should then record
 the profits on this purchase as directed on rows (3)
 and (4). At the end of the period record the total
 of profits and commissions on the last row (41) on
 the page. Subsequent periods should be recorded
 similarly.
 Specific Instructions to Sellers
 During each market period you are free to sell
 to any buyer or buyers as many units as you might
 want. The first unit that you sell during a trading
 period you obtain at a cost of the amount listed on
 the attached sheet in the row (2) marked cost of
 1st unit; if you sell a second unit you will incur the
 cost listed in the row (6) marked cost of 1st unit;
 etc. The profits from each sale (which are yours to
 keep) are computed by taking the difference be-
 tween the price at which you sold and the cost of
 the unit. Under no conditions may you sell a unit
 at a price below the cost of the unit. In addition
 to this profit you will receive a 5 cent commission
 for each sale. That is,
 [your earnings = (sale price of unit)
 - (cost of unit) + 0.05 commission].
 Your total profits and commissions for a trading
 period, which are yours to keep, are computed by
 adding up the profit and commissions on sales made
 during the trading period.
 Suppose for example that your cost of the 1st unit
 is $140 and your cost of the second unit is $160.
 For illustrative purposes we will consider only a two-
 unit case. If you sell the first unit at $200 and the
 second unit at $190, your earnings are:
 $ earnings from 1st = 200 - 140 + 0.05 = 60.05
 $ earnings from 2nd = 190- 160 + 0.05 = 30.05
 total $ earnings = 60.05 + 30.05 = 90.10.
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 The blanks on the table will help you record your
 profits. The sale price of the 1st unit you sell during
 the 1st period should be recorded on row (1) at the
 time of sale. You should then record the profits on
 this sale as directed on rows (3) and (4). At the end
 of the period record the total of profits and commis-
 sions on the last row (41) on the page. Subsequent
 periods should be recorded similarly.
 Market Organization (Posted bid instructions)
 The market for this commodity is organized as
 follows: we open the market for each trading day.
 Each buyer decides on a purchase price which he
 will write on one of the cards provided. The buyers
 will be given two minutes to submit their prices.
 The cards will be collected and the prices written
 on the blackboard. Sellers will then be free to make
 offers to sell whatever quantities they desire and to
 specify the buyer to whom they wish to sell. Offers
 will be made as follows: a seller will be chosen using
 random numbers, and will state the quantity he
 wishes to sell and the buyer to whom he wishes to
 sell. The buyer will then accept any part of the sell-
 er's offer by stating the quantity he wishes to buy.
 However, when a buyer posts a price, he must be
 prepared to buy at least one unit. If the first buyer
 will not purchase all units the seller wants to sell,
 the seller is free to choose a second buyer, and so
 on.
 When the first seller has made all his contracts,
 another seller will be selected at random and he
 will make his desired purchases. The process will
 be continued until there are no offers to sell. This
 completes the trading day. We will reopen the mar-
 ket for a new trading day by having buyers submit
 new prices and the process will be repeated. Except
 for the offers and their acceptance you are not to
 speak to any other subject. You are free to make
 as much profit as you can.
 Are there any questions?
 Market Organization (Oral Double Auction)
 The market for this commodity is organized as
 follows: we open the market for a trading period
 (a trading "day"). The period lasts for - minutes.
 Any buyer (seller) is free at any time during the
 period, to raise his hand and make a verbal bid (offer)
 to buy (sell) one unit of the commodity at a specified
 price. The bid (offer) must be higher (lower) than
 the outstanding bid (offer) should one exist. Any
 seller (buyer) is free at any time to accept or not
 accept the bid (offer) of any buyer (seller). If a bid
 (offer) is accepted, a binding contract has been closed
 for a single unit and the buyer and seller will record
 the contract price to be included in their earnings.
 Any ties in bids or acceptances will be resolved by
 a random choice of buyer or seller. Except for the
 bids (offers) and their acceptance you are not to
 speak to any other subject. There are likely to be
 many bids and offers that are not accepted, but you
 are free to keep trying, and as a buyer or a seller
 you are free to make as much profit as you can.
 Are there any questions?
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